I meet Chris’ wife (unfortunately I forgot her name), who is an indigenous person from the Naga in Manipur, India. We discuss for some time. Later Jannie joins us, indigenous, too, Kadazan from Sabah in Malaysia. Jannie is Secretary General of the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), a regional network of indigenous organizations. Their office is just on the other side of the road.

Later we have lunch in a local restaurant next to the river. The food is excellent and incredibly cheap. Still later I meet with Jannie in the AIPP office. One of her staff, Chingya, joins us and we spend the afternoon with interesting discussions. Chingya is also Naga from Manipur in India. In fact I have met his uncle in Geneva, who is one of the funders of AIPP and lives currently as political refugee in Canada.

Chris’ wife has prepared a great diner and we spend the evening in their house, again with interesting discussion. Helen joins us, a young woman from Australia who works for yet another NGO, the International Alliance of Indigenous Tribal Peoples of Tropical Forests.

It is late in the evening when I try (ultimately successfully) to find my way back home with the moto scooter.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

Please find a short summary below.

In this text, I compare and contrast the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia with theories of multicultural citizenship and minority rights that are emerging in contemporary political philosophy.

The first part of this thesis discusses political theories of multiculturalism, which will then be applied to cultural diversity in Cambodia. A brief discussion of the course of the minority rights debate in three stages serves as a point of departure. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s distinctively liberal theory of minority rights will be introduced. Following a discussion of the importance of cultural membership for the individual, various arguments justifying certain group-rights will be introduced and assessed.

The argument will then turn to recent developments in political theory associated with the emerging position of liberal nationalism. The first part will be summarized in its final section with emphasis on the implications for indigenous peoples. Along the way, criticism leveled against Kymlicka’s theory will be put forward and discussed. The second part is primarily concerned with indigenous peoples in Cambodia. It will begin with a general overview of Cambodia’s cultural minorities. Afterwards, the incorporation of various groups into the Cambodian nation -state and their integration into Cambodia’s mainstream society will be discussed in light of the concepts introduced in the first part. The argument will identify Cambodia’s hill tribes as indigenous peoples and highlight the involuntary nature of their incorporation, while stressing the importance of these groups’ survival for the well-being of their individual members. The discussion will assess current policies towards indigenous peoples in Cambodia with particular emphasis on the Royal Government’s current decentralization program. This part will include the results of empirical research carried out in three northeastern provinces, the objective of which was to assess the situation of indigenous peoples within the current decentralization process and to explore ways of better accommodating the rights of these peoples within the emerging framework of local governance.

Based on the research results as well as the earlier discussion, this paper will explore ways to better accommodate the needs and fair demands of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. Along the way, the validity and limitations of Kymlicka’s concepts in the Cambodian context will be assessed. The hypothesis is that Kymlicka’s theory provides a valid framework to analyze cultural diversity in Cambodia and to understand the challenges involved in accommodating various indigenous peoples. Accordingly, this paper supports the view that meaningful measures of self-government rights, language rights, land rights, and special representation rights for these groups are needed to allow them to sustain their existence as distinct societies. However, institutionalizing these rights is likely to take a shape significantly different from the ‘multination federation’ model preferred by Kymlicka. Given the situation of indigenous peoples in Cambodia and the nature of the Cambodian state, the local level of government is likely to provide the framework for these groups’ accommodation.

The text concludes that a decentralized framework offers many opportunities for improved protection of indigenous rights, as well as for more inclusive democracy and highland peoples’ active participation. To realize those opportunities, differentiated measures to promote indigenous peoples are called for. Those measures should not be seen as ‘privileges’ or ‘special advantages’, but as balancing disadvantages exclusively faced by members of indigenous groups. A multination conception of decentralization helps to compensate for those disadvantages and to ensure that the value of cultural membership is equally protected for all citizens of Cambodia.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

Tourism is changing the face of Mondulkiri. But while increasing numbers of
visitors mean more money for this poor province, fears are that it is the
ethnic-minority hill-tribes who will pay the price.

It is the rainy season and the landscape is at its most beautiful. The grassy
hills shine in lime-green, a vivid contrast against the dark-clouded sky.
Bearm, 14, looks out on her village, Pucham, 11 kilometers outside the
provincial capital of Sen Monorom. It is an isolated place, seemingly forgotten
by time.

Everyone living in the village is Phnong, Mondulkiri’s largest minority, a
hill-tribe people spread out in the jungles of Cambodia’s northeast and across
the border in Vietnam, where the hill tribes are still generically known by the
French-colonial appellation Montagnards – “mountain people”.

The first tourist is yet to set foot in the village, but Bearm hopes it will
happen soon. “I wish they would come,” she says. “It would be interesting to
see them, to see their white skin and beautiful clothes. Maybe I can make
friends with them.”

In a guesthouse in Sen Monorom, Orn Tina, 24, looks hopefully towards the
future. He has just graduated from Mondulkiri’s first course for tourist
guides. With 18 other guides from the province, he has learnt about
environmental protection, local history and English. Orn Tina is ethnic lowland
Khmer, unlike the majority of the 35,000 people in the province. Originally
from Kampong Cham, he has no plans to go back.

“[By working here] I can support myself and improve my English step by step,”
he says, revealing a dream of eventually ending up in one of the province’s few
foreign NGOs.

And it looks like Tina will be busy. With the opening of the new road to Phnom
Penh last year; travel times have been cut from up to two days to just six
hours – and tourism is booming.

Whether it is the isolated jungle waterfalls, the elephant rides to the Phnong
villages or simply the cool air, people are coming in increasing numbers. Local
tourism office statistics reflect the changes: the 4,362 people who have
visited the province during the first half of this year already exceed last
year’s total figure of 3,027.

Nowhere are the changes more visible than in Sen Monorom. This once-sleepy
market town is coming to life. Two years ago, the town had four guest houses.
Today, there are at least fourteen, and this is only the beginning. By the end
of next year, with the new road to Ratanakkiri finished, local tourism office
director Sam Chin expects the figure to double again. Optimists are talking
about Mondulkiri and Ratanakkiri together becoming Cambodia’s center for
eco-tourism, something that would turn the northeast into a major tourist
region.

For the people living here, this is in many ways good news. Jobs are being
created and a new hospital is being built. Half of Sen Monorom is now connected
to 24-hour electricity, with the other half on its way. On the outskirts of
town, popping up along the Phnom Penh road, are new luxury houses built by
successful guesthouse owners, locals say.

“Mondulkiri has changed a lot only over the last couple of years,” says Sam
Chin. “Before, people up here used to live their lives without comforts like
electricity. Now everyone is thinking about how to make things better. It is a
new mentality. And it is good for Mondulkiri.”

Deputy governor Nharang Chan agrees with Sam Chin but says there is a much
bigger potential if the infrastructure could be developed.

“There are so many beautiful places here, but most of them are hidden in the
jungle so we can’t take tourists there.” Chan is one of the few Phnongs holding
a government position.

As a consequence of this development, land prices in Sen Monorom have rocketed.
Lots that cost $150 two years ago now go for three or four times as much.

Braden and Johanna Pewitt – American Seventh day Adventists who live and work
with the Phnong – paint a picture of a speculation boom, where locals and
people from Phnom Penh hope to make the kind of money they hardly dreamed of
before.

When they first came to Mondulkiri two years ago, there were no fences, they
say. Now, everyone is marking up the land. But no one seems to know who they
should buy the land from.
“From my understanding, they just put out fences and if it is far enough out,
no one will care,” Braden Pewitt says, adding: “I am afraid that this could
lead to land disputes.”

This means that the Phnong’s traditional way of life – where they clear new
rice fields every few years – is likely to come under increased pressure. “My
fear for the future is that one day when the Phnong want to clear another
field, someone will show up and say ‘This is my land’,” Braden Pewitt says.

That day might not be far away. There is already talk circulating that some of
the guesthouse owners are buying up the land next to the most popular
waterfalls, traditionally hidden in the jungle. However, one of the guest-house
owners, Long Vibol, denies buying land himself and says he is unaware of others
doing it.

Although the Phnong’s unique culture is one of the attractions drawing visitors
to the province, most of them see very little of the money. All the guest
houses are owned by Khmers and there are few Phnong on the staff lists. Those
fortunate enough to own an elephant get some money from renting out their
animals to the guest houses for tourist rides. But once in the Phnong village,
the huts where the visitors stay overnight may well turn out to be owned by a
guest house.

This situation is in many ways the result of the Phnong’s tradition to stay out
of business. Apart from the occasional roadside stalls, everything is run by
lowland Khmers or the odd Vietnamese immigrant. For the Phnong, the concept of
making money from tourists is abstract.

Soon after their arrival, Braden and Johanna Pewitt asked if they could buy one
of the baskets the Phnong make. But the answer was clear: ‘Make your own!’
After that, they understood why all the souvenir baskets at Sen Monorom’s
market were made in Vietnam.

Tourism office director Sam Chin says he thinks the imports are a shame.

“We have to take measures for this to change. As soon as we get the Phnong to
make enough baskets for the tourists, we will stop importing.”

At the same time, Sam Chin says he worries that the tourist influx will destroy
the Phnong’s traditional way of life. “If more and more people come, I am
afraid the Phnong will start following these people’s lifestyle and in the end
lose their own culture.”

The Pewitts say they want to help the Phnong by making them face the changes in
a way that will benefit them. “We try to make them understand that the tourists
don’t know how to make things out of bamboo.”

Sam Chin talks about the need to educate the Phnong to make them realize the
value in their culture. He says he has an idea to start a project next year,
aimed at making village chiefs aware of the possibilities of tourism. It is all
part of his plan to develop ecologically sustainable tourism, he says.

“If we manage to develop tourism in a way that saves the minority people and
the nature, life up here will be much better in the future. Even for the
Phnong.”

Back in Pucham village, Bearm’s 75-year-old neighbor, Gnoeng Blong, has more
immediate worries on his mind. With a few more weeks of rain, the dirt track
leading to the outside world will turn to mud, making it hard to get his sick
60-year-old wife Toum to the doctor in Sen Monorom.

Sitting in their dark hut with his eyes on the glowing fire, he thinks of the
village where he has spent his life. Temporarily forgetting the few tin roofs
and the odd motorbike, he says in a low tone: “We live the same life here as
then. Nothing has changed since I was a child.”

Phnom Penh Post, Issue 13/16, July 30 – August 12, 2004
© Michael Hayes, 2004. All rights revert to authors and artists on publication.

For permission to publish any part of this publication, contact Michael Hayes,
Editor-in-Chief
http://www.PhnomPenhPost.com – Any comments on the website to Webmaster

The aim of the thesis is to discuss and assess the rights of cultural minorities in Cambodia in the light of Western liberal theories of multiculturalism. More precisely, the thesis compares and contrasts Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship with the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. By doing so, I hope to justify and make plausible specific rights for indigenous peoples, in particular some measure of self-government rights and special representation rights.

Today I finished the first draft of the text. There are still some formal problems and minor inconsistencies in the argumentation. However, I think feedback would be most valuable at this point of the process, where I have still time to accommodate comments and considerations regarding the overall argumentation and structure of the text. Therefore, I make the text available here, as word document (788kb) and .pdf file (631kb). Any feedback will be greatly appreciated.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(Word)

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CAMBODIA

Introduction 2
I. THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM 5
1. Three Stages of the Debate over Minority Rights 5
1. Minority Rights as Communitarianism 5
2. Minority Rights within a Liberal Framework 6
3. Minority Rights as Response to State Nation-Building 7
2. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 10
1. Two Patterns of Cultural Diversity 10
2. Indigenous Peoples 12
3. Group-Differentiated Rights 16
4. Societal Cultures 19
5. Justifying Group-Differentiated Rights 21
6. Judging Group-Differentiated Rights 24
7. Liberal Nationalism 28
8. Liberal Democracy and Nationhood 29
9. Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying 31
10. Indigenous Rights and Decentralization 32
1. CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CAMBODIA 33
1. The Cultural Composition of Cambodia’s Population 35
2. Ethnic Groups: Immigration 36
3. Ethnic Groups: Integration 39
4. Conclusions: Ethnic Groups 42
1. National Minorities: Hill Tribes 44
1. Becoming Minorities: Involuntary Incorporation 44
2. Nation-Destroying: Integrating Hill Tribes into the Khmer Nation 45
3. Nation Building and its Liberal Limits in Cambodia 46
4. Current Policy towards Hill Tribes: Nation-Destroying 50
5. Current Policies towards Hill Tribes: Accommodation 54
6. Decentralization and Nation-Building 57
2. Empirical Research: Indigenous Peoples and Decentralization 60
1. Research Design and Methodology 60
2. Hill Tribes: Meaningful Choices through Societal Cultures 61
3. The Value of Cultural Membership 63
4. Traditional and Formal Institutions 65
5. Access 66
6. Language 69
7. Participation 70
8. Attitudes among Government Officials: Integration 71
9. Representation 73
10. Decentralization and Indigenous Rights 75
11. Justifying Indigenous Rights 77
3. CONCLUSIONS 81
4. LITERATURE 88

The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia
Introduction
The aim of this diploma thesis is to discuss and assess the rights of cultural minorities in Cambodia in the light of Western liberal theories of multiculturalism. More precisely, this thesis compares and contrasts Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship with the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. There are a number of reasons to pay attention to the rights of indigenous peoples and to do so in Cambodia specifically. Indigenous peoples are considered among the world’s most disadvantaged groups and belong to the most vulnerable and impoverished segments of the population in virtually any of the countries in which they are found. This is due to a variety of reasons, among them their exclusion from the decision-making process, small numbers of members, great cultural distance to the majority group, geographical isolation, fragile ecology, and because their ways of live tend to be greatly at odds with modernity . Cambodia is no exception in this respect.
Another reason to discuss indigenous peoples in Cambodia is closely related to a dramatic reversal that has been taking place in many countries in the way indigenous peoples are being treated, particularly in the West and in Latin America. Previously, the expectation was that indigenous peoples would cease to exist due to dying out, inter-marriage, or assimilation. Frequently, governments adopted policies to accelerate this process. This approach has changed radically. Today, all Western and most Latin American countries accept the idea that indigenous peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and that they should have the land claims, cultural rights, and self-government rights needed to perpetuate themselves as distinct societies. A remarkable process of decolonization is taking place throughout these countries, as indigenous peoples regain their lands, self-government, and customary law .
This process corresponds to recent developments in international law, which today reflects the most advanced practice of Western countries regarding indigenous rights. Land claims, customary law, and self-government for indigenous peoples are all firmly recognized in recent international documents, such as the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 169 and the United Nations’ draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Anaya 1996). Besides these declarations of indigenous rights, international financial organizations – such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – have adopted policies designed to recognize and respect the distinct rights of indigenous peoples.
The development in Western and Latin American countries provides a strong contrast to Asia. While some states in Asia are moving towards the greater recognition of the distinct needs and rights of indigenous peoples, no such development has been taking place in most Asian countries and the situation of indigenous peoples has not been subject to much debate . An indication of this contrast is that no Asian country has ratified ILO Convention No. 169 yet. In this regard, too, Cambodia is no exception. Moreover, indigenous groups in Cambodia received even lesser attention compared to neighboring countries, because Cambodia is regarded the culturally most homogenous country in the region, because indigenous peoples make up only a very small proportion of the overall population, and because these groups are characterized by a remarkably low level of organization and mobilization. Given this contrast, it is interesting to analyze and discuss the situation of indigenous peoples in Asia in general and in Cambodia in particular.
There are a number of reasons to use Kymlicka’s theoretical framework for this discussion. Kymlicka was among the first theorists to systematically theorize the rights of cultural minorities and his theory is widely regarded the most influential in its field. This is reflected not least in the fact that the most prominent critics of multiculturalism use his concepts to formulate their objections. Another reason to apply this theory to Cambodia is to test the author’s assumption that important elements of his theory can be applied in many Asian countries (Kymlicka 2003). Furthermore, Kymlicka’s theory presents a distinctively liberal conception of minority rights. Although Cambodia is not a liberal state, many people in Cambodia aspire to liberal institutions and practice. This is reflected in the frequent use of the term in public discourse as well as in Cambodia’s constitution . Given this aspiration, discussing the challenges of cultural pluralism in the light of liberal principles seems a particularly worthwhile exercise in Cambodia and Kymlicka’s theory offers a suitable framework to do so. Other reasons to use Kymlicka’s theory are more practical. This theory is capable of explaining and justifying the dramatic changes regarding the recognition of indigenous rights in Western and Latin American countries mentioned above. Applying it to Cambodia can help to capitalize on the experience of these countries in accommodating their indigenous populations. Furthermore, as the discussion will show, Kymlicka’s theory is consistent with various declarations of indigenous rights in international law mentioned above and capable of justifying their objectives. Increasingly, Cambodia is being expected to comply with these international norms of indigenous rights, not least due to a growing rights-consciousness among members of the affected groups and increasing linkages between local organizations and international networks advocating for indigenous rights. This trend is being reinforced by the considerable involvement of international organizations in Cambodia. For example, the World Bank and ADB have already determined that their policies apply to indigenous peoples in Cambodia . There is widespread agreement that an appropriate policy for Cambodia’s indigenous peoples is needed. However, there is little consensus about how such a policy might look like. Given the increasing importance of international norms of indigenous rights in Cambodia, applying Kymlicka’s theory and discussing its limitations can contribute to a well-informed debate about whether or not the associated models can and should be applied in Cambodia. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to this debate and ultimately to the development of a viable and justifiable policy for Cambodia’s indigenous peoples.
The first part of this thesis discusses the political theory of multicultural citizenship which will then be applied to the Cambodian context in the second part. A brief discussion of the course of the minority rights debate in three stages serves as a point of departure. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s distinctively liberal theory of minority rights will be introduced. This discussion is not limited to indigenous peoples. Rather, Kymlicka’s typology of cultural minorities will facilitate contrasting the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples with other cultural minorities. Following a discussion of the importance of cultural membership for the individual, various arguments justifying certain group-rights will be introduced and assessed. The argumentation will then turn to recent developments in political theory associated with the emerging position of liberal nationalism. In its final section, the first part will be summarized with emphasis on the implication for indigenous peoples. Along the way, criticism leveled against Kymlicka’s theory will be introduced and discussed. The second part is concerned with cultural minorities in Cambodia. Following a general overview of Cambodia’s cultural diversity, the incorporation of various groups into the Cambodian nation-state and their integration into Cambodia’s mainstream society will be discussed in the light of the concepts introduced in the first part. The argumentation will identify Cambodia’s hill tribes as indigenous peoples and highlight the involuntary nature of their incorporation while stressing the importance of these groups’ survival for the well-being of their individual members. The discussion will assess current policies towards indigenous peoples with particular emphasis on the Royal Governments’ current decentralization program. This part will include the results of empirical research carried out in three northeastern provinces.
Based on the research results as well as the earlier discussion the thesis will explore ways to better accommodate the needs and fair demands of indigenous peoples and assess the validity and limitations of Kymlicka’s theory in the Cambodian context. The hypothesis is that Kymlicka’s theory provides a largely valid framework to analyze and understand cultural diversity in Cambodia and the challenges involved in accommodating various indigenous peoples. Accordingly, meaningful measures of self-government rights, language rights, land rights, and special representation rights for these groups are needed to enable them to sustain their existence as distinct societies. However, institutionalizing these rights is likely to take forms significantly different from the ‘multination federation’ model preferred by Kymlicka. Given the situation of indigenous peoples in Cambodia and the nature of the Cambodian state, the local level of government is likely to provide the framework for their accommodation. More research is needed with the active involvement of groups members is needed to develop local models that effectively correspond to the specific situation, needs and interests of Cambodia’s indigenous peoples.
I. THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM
1. Three Stages of the Debate over Minority Rights
1. Minority Rights as Communitarianism
The debate over the rights of minorities during the 70s and 80s was essentially framed in terms of the familiar controversy between liberalism and communitarianism . While promoters of liberalism insist on the priority of individual freedom, communitarians stress that individuals are members of and constituted through groups or communities and embedded in a particular social infrastructure (Rawls 1971; Sandel 1982; Taylor 1992). From the communitarian perspective, individuals are products of social practices and do not revise their conception of the good life. Liberals stress the priority of the rights of free and equal citizens, while communitarians stress the priority of shared values and various forms of communities. Since questions of minority or group-specific rights involve ethnocultural communities mobilizing for the protection of their group, it was believed that one’s position in the minority rights debate derived from one’s position in the communitarianism debate. At this stage, the assumption was that promoters of liberalism would oppose minority rights as subordinating individual autonomy, while communitarians would support minority rights as protecting communities from the corroding influence of liberal individualism. Ethnocultural minorities where thought to maintain a more collective way of life and did not yet give in to liberal autonomy. From the communitarian perspective, minority rights provide those groups with appropriate protection against individualism and help to promote the value and significance of the community. At this stage of the debate, promoting minority rights was bound to endorsing the communitarian critique of liberal individualism, and to understanding minority rights as defense of community-oriented minority groups against liberalism. Promoters of minority rights agreed with communitarians that minority rights contradict liberal individualism and admitted that this simply shows the inherent failure of liberalism. Maybe the most elaborate communitarian supporter of minority rights at this stage of the debate is Vernon Van Dyke. In his book Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (1985) he provides an extensive account of the practice of collective rights in numerous countries. Following this rich variety of examples he criticizes the “arbitrary and unjustified” individualism of liberal-democratic theory. Van Dyke concludes that traditional liberalism “needs to be modified so as to recognize the just claims of certain kinds of groups – that is, so as to concede them rights that are distinct from and not reducible to individual rights” (Van Dyke 1985: 195). Like many communitarians, Van Dyke remains ambiguous towards liberalism and leaves open whether he criticizes liberalism from within or outside this tradition. However, his position is characteristic of the first stage of the minority rights debate, because it endorses the communitarian critique of liberalism and views minority rights as defending cohesive and communally-minded minority groups against the invasion of liberal individualism.
2. Minority Rights within a Liberal Framework
These assumptions were increasingly questioned. It became more and more clear that most ethnocultural groups in Western states are not seeking protection from modernity, but ask for equal participation in modern liberal societies. Even if some members of national minorities contemplate secession, they mostly do not want to create illiberal communitarian societies. In modern democracies, the obligation to individual autonomy crosses ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages. The debate about minority rights thus turns into a debate between groups and individuals who disagree about the interpretation, not about the validity of liberal principles. Promoters of multiculturalism suggest that some group specific rights are in line with – and might indeed be required by – liberal-democratic principles. The question at this stage of the debate is not how to protect illiberal minorities from liberalism, but whether minorities which support liberal principles none the less need minority rights.
Various authors have strengthened this position of liberal culturalism, which insists on the critical significance of cultural identity and national membership for the autonomy of individuals. They point out that pressing interests associated with culture and identities are consistent with liberal freedom and equality.
Margalit and Raz, for example, stress the importance of groups to the well-being of their members and point out that the moral importance of the group’s interest depends on its value to individuals. For them, individual well-being depends on the successful pursuit of goals and relationships. These goals and relationships are products of culture and depend for their existence on shared patterns of expectations, traditions, and conventions. In this perspective, understanding of one’s own culture is what determines the boundaries of the imaginable for the individual. Cultural membership profoundly affects a person’s opportunities and ability to engage in meaningful relationships. Moreover, a person’s sense of identity is bound up with her cultural membership, and her individual self-respect depends in part on the esteem in which her group is being held. Cultures are particularly well-suited for individual self-identification, because they provide the safety of effortless secure belonging. Accordingly, “individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of which contributes to one’s sense of identity, be generally respected and not be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution” (Margalit/Raz 1995: pp. 85). In Kymlicka’s theory, the position of liberal culturalism – and the link between a group and the well being of its individual members – is closely related to the concept of societal culture, which will be discussed in some length in section 4. In short, Kymlicka argues that people make choices about various conception of the good life based on beliefs about the value of those conceptions. Those beliefs require understanding the meanings attached to them by culture, history, and language. Consequently, only access to a societal culture provides individuals with meaningful choices, that is, culture is the precondition of individual autonomy.
This second stage takes the debate beyond the frontline of individualism versus collectivism that has characterized the discussion at its first stage. The question of minority rights is widely debated within liberal theory. Promoters of liberal culturalism support the view that some minority rights advance liberal values. Because special status for minorities presents a stark contrast to the ‘neutral’ operations of the liberal state, the burden of proof lies on its defenders. Liberal culturalists aim to meet this burden of proof by showing the significance of cultural membership in protecting individual freedom and self-respect. They seek to support the view that minority rights supplement individual freedom and equality. The scope of group-specific rights within liberal theory remains deeply controversial . The challenge facing liberal culturalists is to differentiate between minority rights that restrict individual rights from minority rights that supplement them. Kymlicka aims to tackle this problem by distinguishing ‘internal restrictions’ from ‘external protections’. Internal restrictions are minority rights which restrict the freedom of group members. In contrast, external protections are designed to reduce the group’s vulnerability to external pressures. This distinction will be discussed in section 5.
3. Minority Rights as Response to State Nation-Building
The second stage of the debate is increasingly challenged as well, because it is said to misinterpret the role of ethnic identities and language in the liberal state and because it misconceives the requirements the state places on minorities. The underlying assumption of the second stage has been the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state. What marks the third stage of the debate, then, is that this assumption becomes increasingly contested. Typically, liberals have strongly endorsed a strict separation of church and state. As this ideal of ‘benign neglect’ has contributed well to accommodate religious diversity, many liberals have assumed that the model of the neutral state can be applied to cultural diversity as well. Both spheres, culture and religion, are thought to be privatized, that is, not the concern of the liberal state. There are no official cultures with public privileges and the state is understood to be indifferent towards the reproduction of ethnocultural groups. As with religion, citizens are free to pursue and promote matters of culture in their private lives, while the standard operations of the liberal state do not privilege one religion or culture over the other. For many liberals, the United States provide the clearest manifestation of these principles, since it does not have a constitutionally recognized official language. To become American, then, means to agree to certain principles of democracy and individual freedom, while it does not necessitate allegiance to a particular culture. Other theorists claim that the separation of state and culture marks the difference between liberal ‘civic nations’ and illiberal ‘ethnic nations’. While ethnic nations take an active interest in the reproduction of a particular culture and identity, civic nations define national membership entirely in terms of respect for principles of democracy and justice. In the West, claims of minorities for accommodation beyond the common citizenship rights have traditionally been rejected with reference to the principle of ethnocultural neutrality. Because minority rights represent a radical departure from the ideal of a ‘civic nation’ or state neutrality, the burden of proof at the second stage of the debate lies with defenders of group-differentiated rights. As was discussed in the previous section, Kymlicka aims to meet this burden of proof by showing that cultural membership is the precondition of individual freedom and autonomy.
The view that the liberal state is indifferent towards the cultural identity of its citizens is increasingly being rejected. Taylor, for example, objects to the view that “difference-blind” liberalism operates culturally neutral: “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges. As an “organic outgrowth of Christianity” Taylor notes, “liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed” (Taylor 1994: 62). Kymlicka, too, rejects the ideal of the ethnocultural neutral state. He points out that the religion model cannot be applied to the relationship between the state and ethnocultural groups. While it is possible for the state not to have an official religion, the state cannot help but operate its institutions in particular languages, thereby privileging speakers of this language and putting speakers of other languages at a distinct disadvantage. This does not happen by accident. In the case of the United States, for example, decisions about the boundaries of state governments were intentionally made in a way that ensured the dominance of the English language throughout the territory. Ongoing policies reinforce this dominance in several ways. Children are legally required to learn English in schools. To acquire American citizenship, immigrants are legally required to learn English. In practice, command of the English language is required for employment with the government or to secure government contracts. Kymlicka suggests that these decisions are not accidental exceptions to the principle of cultural neutrality, but tightly interrelated. Together, those decisions “have shaped the very structure of the American state, and the way the state structures society (Kymlicka 2001a: 25). The existence of nation-states is no coincidence, but the result of deliberate nation-building policies, adopted by governments to diffuse and promote a common language, culture, and sense of national membership. Among the tools of nation-building are citizenship policy, language laws, education curriculums, public service employment, support for national media, the drawing of internal boundaries, and national symbols. The underlying intention of nation-building policies is the promotion of integration into a single societal culture. As a result of guaranteed rights and freedoms, societal cultures in liberal democracies are inevitably pluralistic. However, linguistic and institutional cohesion intentionally constrains this diversity: Governments have deliberately encouraged citizens to view their life-chances as tied up with participation in common societal institutions that operate in one national language. By doing so, governments have supported a national identity defined in part by common membership in a societal culture. The United States are not an exception in this respect. Rather, promoting integration into the mainstream culture is a function of a ‘nation-building’ project that has been undertaken in all liberal democracies. All liberal-democratic states have historically been nation-building states : “they have encouraged and sometimes forced all the citizens on the territory of the state to integrate into common public institutions operating in a common language” (Kymlicka 2001a: 23). The process of nation-building inevitably privileges members of the majority culture and puts speakers of other languages at a disadvantage. Therefore, the model of the culturally neutral state must be replaced with a model of states engages in nation building, which offers a very different perspective on the debate about minority rights. Claims for minority rights must be understood in the context of, and as a defensive response to, state nation-building. This relationship is what Kymlicka calls the dialectic of state nation-building and minority rights. Thus, Kymlicka arrives at the third stage of the debate. At this stage, the question is not anymore how to justify deviation from the ideal of cultural neutrality. Rather, the question is whether minority rights help to protect against unjust disadvantages. The burden of proof at this stage is at least partly on those who object to minority rights.

Illustration 1: ct. Kymlicka 2002: 362
In this perspective it is not cultural neutrality what distinguishes liberal states from illiberal states. Indeed, Kymlicka suggests that nation-building has a legitimate role to play in liberal democratic societies. The benefits associated with nation-building will be introduced in section 7. What characterizes liberal states is not their cultural neutrality, but that majority nation-building is subject to certain limitations. So far, there is no systematic theoretical account on the liberal limits of nation-building. In a recent book, Kymlicka suggests the following three conditions:
1. No groups of long-term residents are permanently excluded from membership in the nation. Everyone living on the territory must be able to gain citizenship and become an equal member of the nation if he so wishes.
2. The integration required of immigrant groups is understood in a ‘thin’ sense, and involves primarily institutional and linguistic integration, not the adoption of particular sets of customs, religious beliefs, or lifestyles.
3. National minorities are allowed to engage in their own nation-building, to enable them to maintain themselves as distinct societal cultures (Kymlicka 2001: 48).
The third stage of the minority rights debate is closely associated with Kymlicka’s theory. The dialectic of nation-building and minority rights represents an important innovation in Kymlicka’s theory and the associated arguments in his theory will be discussed in more detail after his initial theory is outlined.
2. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
1. Two Patterns of Cultural Diversity
Any theory of group-differentiated rights must distinguish between various groups in order to assign certain specific rights to them. The major concern of this thesis is with the rights of indigenous peoples. However, outlining Kymlicka’s complete typology of cultural minorities will allow contrasting the nature and demands of various groups and make more plausible the specific rights this theory assigns to indigenous peoples.
The central distinction in Kymlicka’s theory differentiates between two patterns of cultural diversity: national minorities and ethnic groups (immigrant groups). According to this distinction, it is the mode of their incorporation into the political community what shapes the nature of a minority group, the identities of its members, and the form of relationship they desire with the larger society. While the existence of ethnic groups comes about by their voluntary migration, national minorities were involuntarily incorporated into larger states . The distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups has a descriptive and a normative dimension, which are not well separated in Kymlicka’s writing. On the descriptive level, the distinction asserts that in the real world various national minorities have relevant characteristics in common which they do not share with various ethnic groups and vice versa. On the normative level, the distinction suggests that it is justified to assign different rights to national minorities and to ethnic groups. Although Kymlicka does not explicitly make this point, it is consistent with the liberal point of view he is supporting: Because the basis of political legitimacy is the consent of the governed, it seems plausible to assign stronger cultural rights to groups whose members did not choose to join the political community (that is, persons who cannot said to have sign the social contract, to refer to the theoretical model central to liberal theory).
The distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups corresponds to and is closely associated with other important concepts and distinctions in Kymlicka’s theory. The table below presents these central terms and their relationships. Following a brief discussion of both types of groups, the argumentation will address each of the terms in the list and show how they relate to the initial distinction. The second part of this thesis will discuss cultural diversity in Cambodia in the light of these concepts. Part of this discussion is to assess whether or not those terms and concepts useful to describe and analyze Cambodia’s cultural minorities.
Ethnic Groups National Minorities
Multicultural States Polyethnic States Multination States
Source of Cultural Pluralism Immigration Colonization, Conquer, Annexation, Ceding
Mode of Incorporation Voluntary Involuntary
Model in Western Democracies Immigrant Multiculturalism Multination Federalism
Group-Differentiated Rights Polyethnic rights Self-government rights, special representation rights
Rationale, Purpose Integration Accommodation, Separation, Autonomy
Societal Culture No Yes
Emerging Consensus: Liberal Culturalism Liberal multiculturalism Liberal nationalism
Question What are fair terms of integration? What are permissible forms of nation-building?
In the case of national minorities, cultural diversity arises from the coexistence of two or more nations within a given state. The term ‘nation’ here is used synonymously with ‘people’ or ‘culture’ and defined as “a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture” (Kymlicka 1995a: 11). Consequently, a given country which contains more than one nation is a multination state and the smaller peoples form national minorities. National minorities form previously self-governing and territorially concentrated cultures. In most cases, the incorporation of national minorities into a state occurs involuntarily and often forcefully. In few cases, multination states come about by the voluntarily agreement between different cultures to form a federation. Many countries are multinational, since boundaries throughout the world were drawn to incorporate the territory of pre-existing, and previously self-governing, societies. Typically, national minorities want to maintain their existence as distinct societies alongside the national majority. In many instances, national minorities struggle to sustain or regain their institutions of self-government and their distinct language. Frequently, they demand some form of autonomy or various self-government rights to make certain the perpetuation of their culture (ct. Kymlicka 1995a: 10).
The second pattern of cultural diversity arises from the voluntary immigration of families and individuals. ‘Ethnic groups’ (or immigrant groups) are not ‘nations’ and do not occupy territories. The existence of ethnic groups in states comes about by individual or familial decisions to abandon the original culture and migrate to another society, leaving behind friends and families. Over generations, ethnic communities with some measure of internal cohesion and organization emerge. States which accepted significant numbers of individuals and families from other cultures as immigrants and allow them to maintain some of their ethnic particularity are polyethnic states. The distinctiveness of ethnic groups is expressed for the most part in family lives and voluntary associations. This is not inconsistent with their linguistic integration and participation in the public institutions of the majority culture. While immigrant groups have struggled for the right to express their ethnic particularity, they typically wish to assert this right in common public institutions: “While ethnic groups frequently demand greater recognition of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and self-governing nation alongside the larger society, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences” (Kymlicka 1995a: 11). Unlike national minorities, the recreation of the original culture is neither desirable nor feasible for immigrant groups. Rather, ethnic groups have typically accepted the expectation of their integration into the larger culture and the assumption that their children’s life-chances will be bound up with the language and institutions of the host society. Instead of resisting majority nation-building towards their integration into the larger society, immigrants frequently wish to renegotiate the terms of integration, to allow for the maintenance of various aspects of their particular ethnic heritage .
2. Indigenous Peoples
Generally, there is no universally agreed definition of indigenous peoples. While Kymlicka treats indigenous peoples as subcategory of national minorities, other theorists argue that indigenous peoples should be seen as entirely distinct category with specific rights. There are various justifications for singling out indigenous peoples for stronger rights, such as the scale of their historical mistreatment or their ‘radical’ cultural difference. In various writings, Kymlicka has altered and complemented his typology and has defined various sub-categories. However, the distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups remains a central feature of his theory. In recent works, Kymlicka suggests to subdivide national minorities into substate nation’ (or stateless nations) and indigenous peoples. In this view, the major difference is the groups’ role in the process of state-formation: “stateless nations were contenders but losers in the process of European state-formation, whereas indigenous peoples were entirely isolated from that process until very recently, and so retained a pre-modern way of life until well into this century” (Kymlicka 2001a: 122). While indigenous peoples existed outside the system of modern nation-states, substate nations aspired to such a state but lost in the contest and consequently do not have a state in which they form a majority. Substate nations find themselves sharing a state with other nations for reasons such as conquer, annexation, ceding, or royal marriage. Indigenous peoples are peoples whose homelands have been overrun by settlers, and who have been involuntarily incorporated into states run by people they regard as foreigners. In contrast to substate nations, indigenous peoples typically do not seek a nation-state with competing economic and social institutions. Rather, indigenous peoples tend to demand the ability to maintain certain traditional ways of life yet participating in the modern world on their own terms. As a starting point, indigenous peoples demand respect for and recognition of their culture to overcome their status as second-class citizen, non-citizen, or slaves. Kymlicka continues to stress that important characteristics are shared by substate nations and indigenous peoples. In particular, all these groups typically formed complete societies in their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state, and all those groups tend to resist state nation-building policies. The following picture provides an overview of one variation of Kymlicka’s typology.

Illustration 2 ct. Kymlicka 1995
In her recent book The Claims of Culture, Seyla Benhabib defends what she calls a dual-track conception of deliberative democracy. She devotes many pages to criticisms of various aspects of Kymlicka’s theory. In particular the distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups is subject to her objections. Firstly, she insists that a sharp distinction between those classes of groups is hard to sustain on the descriptive level. Whether or not this is a valid criticism is an empirical question and impossible to answer in the framework of this thesis. However, it should be pointed out that this distinction provides a meaningful description of cultural diversity in Cambodia, as the second part of this thesis will show. Secondly, Benhabib criticizes that the distinction insists upon the historical genealogy of the integration of groups which she claims is tantamount to cultural essentialism (Benhabib 2002: pp. 62). However, Kymlicka agrees that – in principle – ethnic groups can become national minorities and vice versa. Moreover, he admits that people do move between cultures do to integrate into other societies. What he insists upon is the value of cultural membership and what he questions is whether people who did not chose to immigrate should be required to integrate into the majorities language and institutions. Insofar, he cannot be blamed for cultural essentialism. Interestingly, Benhabib does not address the situation of indigenous peoples throughout her book. Only in the very end, Benhabib mentions that “… there are peoples whose cultural identity is rooted in ways of life attached to a particular region, territory, or hunting and fishing domain. These peoples are seeking not to preserve their languages, customs, and culture alone but to retain the integrity of ways of life greatly at odds with modernity … I think that from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, we need to create institutions through which members of these communities can negotiate and debate the future of their own conditions of existence. I follow Kymlicka … in advocating certain land, language, and representation rights for indigenous populations” (Benhabib 2002: pp. 184). It remains unclear what reason justifies this surprising move. Why should we create institutions through which members of indigenous peoples can negotiate their future but deny such institutions to members of stateless nations? Is it because indigenous peoples’ ways of life are ‘attached to the land’ or because those ways of life are ‘greatly at odds with modernity’? There does not seem to be any reason inherent to Benhabib’s theory of deliberative democracy which would support granting specific rights to indigenous peoples. Moreover, it seems that she falls herself into the trap of cultural essentialism, by indicating that attachment to land and premodern ways of lives are essential features of indigenous societies. In this view, members of indigenous peoples stop being indigenous as soon as they modernize their ways of live, lets say: drive cars, use self phones, or live in cities. This does not seem to respond to the aspirations of indigenous peoples who in most instances desire to incorporate elements of modernity into their cultures and yet demand recognition and protection of their existence as separate societies. Taken together, Benhabib’s theory of deliberative democracy does not allow understanding and explaining the different aspirations of various groups. Throughout her book, the specific political implications of her model remain unclear. In contrast to Benhabib’s concept, Kymlicka’s theory is particularly well suited to discuss and analyze cultural diversity, because it is comprehensive and capable of integrating and justifying the right of different classes of groups within a single and consistent theoretical framework. This case will be strengthened during the following chapters.
In line with both Benhabib’s and Kymlicka’s theory, current and emerging international law grants considerable levels of political autonomy to indigenous peoples. Yet in line with Benhabib’s theory and in contrast to Kymlicka’s, there is a strong tendency in international law to strictly separate questions of indigenous rights from the rights of stateless nations and other cultural minorities. Generally, the relevant declarations grant considerably more cultural rights – such as land claims and customary law – to indigenous peoples than to any other class of group. Under present international law, the specific rights of indigenous peoples are found only under ILO Convention No. 169. This convention does not define indigenous peoples. Rather, it contains a statement of coverage and a subjective criterion, stressing the self-identification of groups as indigenous peoples. However, the statement of coverage underlines that indigenous peoples live in historical continuity in a certain area since before the establishment of modern states, maintain a way of live different from other segments of the society, and retain their own institutions and organizations . Insofar, the ILO’s definition of indigenous peoples and Kymlicka’s distinctions are very likely to identify the same groups as indigenous peoples. The specific rights of indigenous peoples contained in Convention No. 169 are considerably different from human rights and other minority rights in that they are intended to allow for a high degree of autonomous development and allocates authority to those peoples so that they can make their own decisions (Eide/ Daes 2000: 8). Although referring to peoples, Convention No. 169 does not deal with the question whether indigenous groups have the right to self-determination. More far-reaching rights are proposed in the UN’s draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. If ratified by the General Assembly, this declaration will determine in its article 3 that indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination and by virtue of that right be entitled freely to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. In its political implications, Kymlicka’s theory is highly consistent with both Convention 169 as well as the draft UN’s draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As both organizations have considerable operations in Cambodia, it is worth mentioning that the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have adopted policies designed specifically to provide guidance to staff to deal with indigenous peoples . And the definitions in both policies are likely to identify the same groups as indigenous peoples as does Kymlicka’s typology. The objective of the World Bank’s policy is to ensure “full respect for [indigenous peoples’] dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness (World Bank 1991: Article 6). It would not make much sense to respect indigenous peoples’ ‘cultural uniqueness’ and yet promote their integration. Insofar, the World Bank’s policy appears to promote the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, like the other concepts discussed in this section.
Again, while Kymlicka treats indigenous peoples as subcategory of national minorities, other theorists as well as international law tend to treat indigenous peoples as a distinct and separate category. However, this thesis won’t discuss that difference in debt, because it does not matter much to the Cambodian case. To anticipate an important insight of the second part of this thesis, applying Kymlicka’s typology to cultural diversity in Cambodia leads to the conclusion that there are no national minorities in Cambodia other than indigenous peoples. Put differently, there are no sub-state nations or stateless nations in Cambodia. In consequence, this means for Cambodia that all the concepts introduced in this section – namely: Kymlicka’s typology, Benhabib’s theory, Convention 169, the UN’s indigenous declaration, and World Bank and ADB policy – would single out indigenous peoples and grant various rights to sustain their distinct existence exclusively to these groups. While the last paragraphs dealt with different classes of groups, the next section will deal with different classes of group-specific rights.
3. Group-Differentiated Rights
For liberals, the protection of individual civil and political rights is of central importance to accommodate cultural difference. In many instances, the protection of those common rights is sufficient to provide space for cultural difference. However, liberal culturalists point out that in other instances it is only through measures beyond common citizenship rights that cultural differences can be accommodated. Kymlicka claims that virtually every modern democracy is using one or more group-specific mechanisms to accommodate cultural differences. He distinguishes between three forms of group-differentiated rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. This typology is related to the initial distinction between ethnic groups and national minorities: in general, Kymlicka suggests that national minorities – including indigenous peoples – can legitimately demand self-government rights and special representation rights. In contrast, ethnic groups typically demand – and should be granted – polyethnic rights and possibly special representation rights.

Illustration 3: ct. Kymlicka 1995
Self-government rights typically involve the devolution of powers to a political subunit which is substantially controlled by the members of a minority group and which substantially corresponds to the group’s traditional homelands. Self-government rights in the form of some political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction are typically demanded by national minorities to ensure the free development of their cultures. Its most extreme form is secession. One way to acknowledge self-government is federalism, which divides powers between the central and various regional governments. It is particularly well suited were national minorities are living territorially concentrated, because the internal boundaries can be drawn so that the group forms a majority in one of the subunits. This can ensure that members of the group are not outvoted by the larger society on vital issues. Federalism is used in Canada to accommodate national diversity with regard to the Quebecois. Moreover, following the demands of the Inuit indigenous group, the Canadian government has approved the redrawing of federal boundaries, so that members of the Inuit form a partially self-governing majority in Nunavut, the eastern half of the Northwest Territories. Nunavut covers about one-fifth of the Canadian land mass (Levy 2000: pp. 307). In contrast, deliberate decisions in the United States were made not to utilize federalism for the accommodation of cultural diversity. Consequently, none of the United State’s existing sub-state units serves to secure self-government for a national minority (Kymlicka 1995: 29). However, self-government for national minorities in the United States is instead achieved outside the federal system (such as in Puerto Rico, Guam) and through political institutions inside existing states (such as Indian reservations). Kymlicka argues that the absence of constitutional protections has tended to make national minorities in the United States more vulnerable. At the same time, those mechanisms can be adjusted more flexibly to the needs and interests of various national minorities. In most cases in North America, federalism is not a valid option for indigenous peoples because they rarely form a majority in one of the sub-state units. Moreover, no redrawing of state boundaries would create majorities of indigenous peoples due to the large influx of settlers. Self-government for most indigenous peoples has been achieved through a system of reserved lands and substantial powers were devolved from the federal government to the tribal or band council. Increasingly Indian tribes or bands were able to acquire control over health, education, family law, policing, criminal justice, and resource development. In effect, they are becoming “a third order of government, with a collection of powers that is carved out of both federal and state/provincial jurisdictions” (Kymlicka: 1995: 30). Similar systems are being sough by indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. Kymlicka supports the view that the incorporation of indigenous peoples into states should be a voluntary act of federation, which recognizes those groups as distinct peoples and respects their inherent right to self-government over their homelands. In this view, indigenous groups should have the freedom to determine for themselves how to manage their traditional homelands within the constraints of principles of justice (Kymlicka 2001a: pp. 148). Self-government for national minorities is not seen as corrective, transitional measure for past oppression, but as inherent and therefore permanent.
Polyethnic rights are typically demanded by ethnic groups in polyethnic states. The demands of ethnic groups have challenged the expectation that their members would abandon all aspects of their cultural heritage. Their claims have gradually expanded beyond the rights to freely express their particularity without fear of discrimination in the larger society. Kymlicka argues that policies designed to prevent discrimination are primarily directed at guaranteeing the common rights of citizenship and should therefore not be considered group-differentiated rights. In contrast, polyethnic rights are positive measures such as the recognition of minority cultures in the curriculum or public funding of cultural practices, such as for ethnic organizations and events or for the provision of immigrant language education in schools. This is mostly defended on the grounds that public funding for art and culture tends to be biased in favor of majority cultural expressions. The most disputed demands are for exemptions from laws that appear to disadvantage members of religious groups, such as exemption from Sunday closing or animal slaughtering legislation for Jews and Muslims, exemptions from the helmet requirement while driving motor bikes for Sikhs, or exemptions from the official dress-codes in schools, police force and the military. According to Kymlicka, this sort of groups-differentiated measures – or ‘polyethnic rights’ “are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society” (Kymlicka 1995: 31). Because the associated cultural differences are not meant to be eliminated, polyethnic rights are seen as permanent. However, the rationale of polyethnic rights is the promotion of integration, not self-government.
There has been increasing interest in the idea of special representation rights. The concern in many democracies is that the political process fails to reflect the diversity of the citizenry. This concern is not limited to cultural minorities, but includes any marginalized or disadvantaged group, such as sexual minorities, the disabled, and so on. The idea of special representation is that an appropriate proportion of seats in government bodies should be reserved for members of disadvantaged or marginalized groups. Special representation rights are usually being justified as response to systemic disadvantages in the political process which does not allow for the proper representation of the group’s views and interests. To the extent that these rights are meant to compensate for disadvantages, they are seen as temporary measure, because the removal of disadvantages eliminates the need for those rights. However, special representation is sometimes defended as a result of self-government, because those rights would be weakened if an external body could unilaterally abolish the associated powers. Because the claims for self-government are seen as inherent, so too are the measures of special representation which stem from it (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 131).
4. Societal Cultures
As was mentioned earlier, the position of liberal culturalism aims to show that some minority rights are consistent with liberal freedom and equality. In Kymlicka’s theory, it is the concept of societal cultures that offers the crucial connection between individual freedom and autonomy on one hand and the group on the other hand. In short, he argues that access to a societal culture is the precondition of the liberal value of freedom of choice. A societal culture is “ a culture which provide its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka 1995: 76). This notion of culture is closely associated with notions of ‘nation’ or ‘people’. Societal cultures exist territorially concentrated and contain a common language as well as shared institutions and practices. Kymlicka argues that the modern world is divided into such societal cultures .
Why is liberal freedom linked to the presence of such societal cultures? Kymlicka identifies individual freedom and autonomy as the defining features of liberalism. Liberalism allows people to choose among a wide range of conceptions of the good life. Moreover, liberalism grants the freedom to question those beliefs and to rationally assess and possibly revise those conceptions in the light of emerging information and new experiences. When people make choices about various conceptions of the good life, they do so based on beliefs about the values of social practices surrounding them. And to have such a belief about the value of particular practices requires an understanding of the meanings assigned to it by culture, language, and history. Whether or not an action or project has any significance to an individual depends on whether, and how, her language attaches meaning to this action or project. For the individual, understanding the cultural narratives provided by her history and language is the precondition of intelligent judgments among available options. It follows that societal cultures not only provide options to citizens, but make those options meaningful to them. Therefore, access to a societal culture is a precondition of liberal freedom and autonomy. Accordingly, group-differentiated rights which secure and promote this access for members of minority cultures should be seen as legitimate from a liberal perspective (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 82) .
Kymlicka stresses that immigrants and national minorities relate very differently to the majority culture. In general, national minorities maintain a societal culture, while ethnic groups do not. Accordingly, the claims of immigrant groups are best met not with self-government rights, but with polyethnic rights. Immigrant bring with them elements of their cultural heritage. However, they have uprooted themselves from their societal culture and left behind the associated set of societal institutions, to which language and historical narratives initially referred to. Even if immigrants would hope to re-create their societal culture, this would be impossible, since immigrants do not come as communities and settle territorially dispersed. In most liberal countries, immigrants are allowed and encouraged to maintain elements of their culture. This, however, is not a change in whether immigrants integrate into the majority culture but how they integrate. While immigrants maintain and nurture aspects of their cultural heritage, it does not take the form of recreating a distinct and institutionally complete societal culture alongside the majority culture. Rather, it contributes new options to the larger society. After a few generations the language of the host country becomes the mother tongue and learning the original mother tongue is not much different from learning a foreign language. For the children of immigrants, it is not their parents’ culture but the host society which provides meaningful options. Immigrants do not attempt to set up a separate societal culture, but ask to adapt the institutions and practices of the mainstream society to ethnic differences so to make the possession of an ethnic identity a normal part of life in the mainstream society (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 95).
The relationship of national minorities to the majority societal culture is different. Members of those groups did not choose to migrate to another state. They did not uproot themselves from their original culture, but formed ongoing societal cultures by the time they where incorporated into the majority culture. Their language and narratives were embodied in a complete set of institutions and social practices, covering the full range of social life and defining meaningful options to their members. National minorities have typically been determined to maintain and perpetuate their existence as distinct societal cultures, despite enormous economic and political pressures towards assimilation or integration. Those groups do not form subgroups within the larger society, but genuinely distinct societal cultures.
Can national minorities loose their capability to form and maintain their societal culture? In particular indigenous peoples have been coercively assimilated in many countries. In such cases, should the group be integrated into the mainstream instead of attempting to preserve what is already lost? Kymlicka notes that in fact a very small number of indigenous peoples has opted to give up their self-government rights and chosen to be treated as a disadvantaged ethnic group. While national minorities surely have no duty to perpetuate a distinct society, the decision whether or not to integrate must be made by members of those groups. Otherwise, the majority would have perverse incentives to profit from injustices towards national minorities, to destroy their societal culture and deny self-government rights based on that destruction. Kymlicka points out that, under appropriate conditions, weakened cultures can regain their strength and richness: “There is no reason to think that indigenous groups, for example, cannot become vibrant and diverse cultures, drawing on their cultural traditions while incorporating the best of the modern world …” (Kymlicka 1995: 100).
At this point it could legitimately be asked why people’s capacity to make meaningful choices depends on access to their own culture, as long as access to the majority culture is secured. No doubt, great numbers of immigrants where glad to integrate into other cultures and function well in their new societies. Kymlicka admits that indeed some people genuinely move between cultures. Yet he points out that even where integration is successful it is a difficult and costly process. People who did not voluntarily choose to move might not legitimately be required to bear the costs of integration. He suggests seeing the choice to leave one’s culture as equivalent to choose a life of perpetual poverty and enter a religious order (Kymlicka 1995: 86). It is taken for granted that the desire for material resources is so normal that people cannot reasonably be expected to relinquish those resources, although some people might voluntarily choose to do so. Analogues, Kymlicka argues that the attachment to one’s culture is usually too strong to be given up. If this is so, access to one’s own culture should be treated as something that people can be expected to want and to which they are entitled.
Another line of reasoning supports this case. Kymlicka argues that a system of open borders would dramatically increase the territory in which people could be treated as free and equal individuals. At the same time, such a system would render people’s own national community vulnerable to being overrun by settlers from other nations and would threaten their survival as a distinct society. Given this choice between increased mobility without borders on one hand and limited mobility but protected existence of the distinct culture on the other hand, most people have preferred the latter. For most people, it has been there nation in which they want to be free and equal individuals. In addition, few liberal theorists have advocated open borders. Rather, they have taken for granted that it is freedom and equality within the own culture what matters most to people: “In short, liberal theorists have generally, if implicitly, accepted that cultures or nations are basic units of liberal political theory” (Kymlicka 1995: 93).
5. Justifying Group-Differentiated Rights
Kymlicka offers three arguments in support of group-differentiated rights: the equality argument, historical agreements, and the inherent value of cultural diversity. As the discussion will show, the last argument is not well-suited to justify self-government rights for national minorities. Moreover, there are no treaties or historical agreements between the majority society and indigenous peoples in Cambodia. Therefore, the discussion here and in the second part will focus on the equality argument. In addition, the analogy between cultural minorities and the existence of states will be explored.
According to the equality argument, group-specific rights are needed to compensate for pervasive and morally arbitrary disadvantages that are faced exclusively by members of minority cultures. It asserts that group-differentiated measures are needed to ensure that all citizens are treated with genuine equality (Kymlicka 1995: 108). Minority groups are unfairly disadvantaged and the survival of their societal cultures is vulnerable to decisions made by the majority. Therefore, given the importance of cultural membership to individuals, this situation creates serious disadvantages for members of cultural minorities, which members of the majority do not face. Accordingly, various minority rights eliminate inequalities, rather than creating them. Group-differentiated rights can help to rectify disadvantages and alleviate the vulnerability of the minority culture. For example, self-government rights can provide members of national minorities with the opportunity to live and work in their own culture, something which is taken for granted by members of the majority.
As was discussed earlier, while governments can be neutral with regard to religion, state neutrality is impossible with regard to ethnicity and culture. While states can abstain from having an official religion, institutions are to be o

HANOI, Vietnam (AP) – Vietnam’s Central Highlands remained sealed off Monday by
police and security officials following protests by hundreds of ethnic minority
Christians over Easter weekend.

Scores were arrested and injured when more than a thousand people took to the
streets Saturday in Buon Ma Thuot, the provincial capital of Daklak, in what
was supposed to be peaceful prayer demonstrations against religious repression
and land confiscation. Most of the indigenous mountain tribes are Protestant.

One witness said some protesters converged on the capital driving tractors,
while police said demonstrations drawing 300-400 people each took place at
several spots around the city.

State-controlled media reported Monday that thousands of people, including
ethnic minority groups, celebrated Easter in the Central Highlands provinces of
Daklak, Gia Lai and Kon Tum. There was no mention of protests.

The area has been closed off to all foreigners, with flights to Buon Ma Thuot
canceled since Saturday and roads leading into the town blocked. Over the
weekend, a U.S. Embassy delegation was forced by police to turn back in
neighboring Binh Phuoc province.

Vietnam has blamed “overseas instigation” for triggering the protests, which
are a repeat of mass demonstrations in 2001.

“In recent days, some extremists in some localities in Daklak and Gia Lai
provinces – with overseas instigation – have engaged in actions of causing
social disorder, even assaulting authorities, destroying public welfare
projects and property in some villages,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Dung
said in a statement.

Police confirmed that dozens of ethnic minority villagers, collectively called
Montagnards, were detained Saturday while scores of people were injured in an
area of Vietnam that has been politically volatile over issues of ethnic
minority rights.

On Monday, police said the situation in the city was “peaceful,” while one Buon
Ma Thuot resident said things had returned to normal following Saturday’s
demonstrations.

International human right groups said they received independent reports from
witnesses of violent clashes and multiple arrests.

“We’ve heard there have been many arrests; many more people are going into
hiding,” a representative from New York-based Human Rights Watch said.

On Monday, Nikola Mihajlovic, head of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
office in Phnom Penh, said 74 Montagnards have crossed the border and sought
asylum in Cambodia over the past month.

In 2001, similar unprecedented protests took place in the Central Highlands,
triggering a mass exodus into Cambodia. Nearly 1,000 refugees were accepted by
the United States for political asylum. Human rights groups assert that more
than 100 people have been jailed in Vietnam for helping organize those
demonstrations.

Government officials have blamed the North Carolina-based Montagnard Foundation
for organizing both demonstrations. The U.S-based organization was founded by
former members of a group of anti-communist Montagnard fighters allied with the
United States during the Vietnam War.

04/12/04 04:59 EDT

Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. The information contained in the AP news
report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or otherwise distributed
without the prior written authority of The Associated Press. All active
hyperlinks have been inserted by AOL.

Dozens of Vietnamese ethnic minority Montagnards, who fled to Cambodia, are seeking help from the United Nations refugee agency in Phnom Penh.

A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman says that more than 40 Montagnards have arrived in Phnom Penh, seeking help from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Three years ago some 1,000 Montagnards fled to Cambodia after Vietnamese security forces put down anti-government demonstrations, sparked when their land was confiscated and given to ethnic Vienamese.

Both Cambodia and Vietnam have since taken strong measures to restrict movement and resettlement by the Montagnards.

08/04/2004 22:53:21 | ABC Radio Australia News

Published on Feb 28, 2004

Thousands of Thai-style Buddha statues will be removed from Cambodian pagodas because they distort Khmer Buddhism and present a threat of outside influence, religion officials said in a report yesterday.

Thai Buddha images have been banned in neighbouring Cambodia since 2002, but several statues donated by Thailand have made their way into Khmer pagodas and temples in what is being seen as a challenge to Cambodia’s religious identity, the Cambodia Daily reported.

“We are worried for the future of our religion,” Chao Sikano, chief of the religion department in Banteay Meanchey province bordering Thailand, told the paper, adding that 410 Thai-style Buddha statues were on display in pagodas there.

“We will have a crisis for the next generation” if the issue is not addressed, he said in the English language daily.

“The Thais have a long-term strategy to invade our culture and religion,” he added.

The Thai statues are different from their Khmer counterparts in that they have longer noses, more feminine hands and a different figure, the paper said.

Thai script is written on the back, and Chao Sikano said portraits of the Thai king are embedded inside the statues.

Uong Sophearith, of Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, said the statues, collected mainly near the Thai border, will be moved to an as yet undetermined central storage facility.

He said the religion ministry would coordinate with those of interior, border soldiers and police to enforce the ban.

Thailand and Cambodia have had historically testy ties, with various Khmer and Thai kingdoms battling each other for cultural and political supremacy over the centuries.

Meanwhile Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Cambodia had the right to act because of the country’s law prohibiting the import of Thai-style Buddha statues.

Thailand is nevertheless worried with the ban in Cambodia, he said, because religion should strengthen relations between both countries.

Agence France-Presse

The Nation

PHNOM PENH

http://nationmultimedia.com/page.news.php3?clid=4&id=109103&usrsess=1

UNICEF has urged governments worldwide to take greater responsibility in ensuring the rights of indigenous children, whom it described as one of the most marginalized groups.
A study, drawn up by UNICEF’s Innocenti Research Center, said 300 million indigenous peoples, spread across more than 70 countries, have far less access to health and education compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. Children suffered the worst, it said.
“The responsibility to promote and protect the human rights of indigenous children is universal,” Carol Bellamy, executive director of the United Nations Children’s Fund, said Wednesday at the launching of the report.
“Indigenous people live with a legacy of oppression, exclusion and extreme poverty,” she added.
Bellamy said the aim of the report, “Ensuring the Rights of Indigenous Children,” was “to see that this issue is placed squarely and unambiguously on the agenda of every government.”
The most pressing problems concerned health and education.
“One way to make indigenous children less invisible right from the beginning is birth registration,” said Bellamy. “Because at least if you exist in the eyes of the system perhaps there may be better delivery of services.”
The study indicated that indigenous children’s problems were not restricted to income-poor nations and that it extended from the United States to Australia, and Bolivia to Cambodia.
She cited examples such as the poor level of education provided for American Indian children in the United States and the disproportionately high percentage of aboriginal children entangled in the juvenile justice system in Australia.
“In northeast Cambodia, indigenous children’s chances of survival are put at less than half of that of the population as a whole,” she added.
Strong social and political action and commitment was needed on behalf of governments, not just individual groups, she said.
©2004 Associated Press
www.sfgate.com

We get up at 7 am and have breakfast in the guesthouse, before we go to the market and buy food and water. To make sure we don’t get stuck we find a mechanic, have the oil checked and fill up the motos.

Then we head northeast to Bou Sra. We never rode north on this road before and I am surprised that right behind the first hill it is getting rougher than most we have seen yesterday. We cross a small river on an improvised bridge and are charged 500 Riel each by a bunch of kids.

After that the road is getting somewhat smoother but still requires a lot of attention. There are deep grooves in the road, most likely left behind my heavy cars. Once you get into one of those it leaves you with only very few options other than just following it hoping not to get stuck. Yet the ground is solid and provides good grip for the tires.

We keep going and after some time we do not see settlements anymore. The forest is relatively dense and in some places impenetrable. Both of us have to restart the bike a number of times and while we proceed with moderate speed it remains a challenge in many places to maneuver those relatively heavy bikes.

The way I start this bike many times is I put it on the stand, climb on the moto and start it from this relatively comfortable position, before I flap the stand and go. However, I realize that the stand is about to break off and can hardly support the bike anymore.

The ‘road’ is getting tougher; there are many rocks and countless obstacles, sometimes forcing us to ride next to the road. And hills are pretty steep in some instances. Overall we move quite slowly. After about 40 minutes we have a break. I try to figure how Pongro is riding down those hills and ask him. I learn that he controls the speed entirely with the clutch. I am about to suggest using a lower gear. To demonstrate how he does it he takes the clutch clever and holds it tight. Oddly, at precisely this moment the clutch cable breaks. I does not take us long to realize that it is impossible to ride this bike without clutch. Ironically, today is the first day we go without the heavy set of tools and spare parts we usually carry and which includes a clutch cable.

Pongro is still confident that we can manage to fix the bike here. Once in while people pass on small, old Honda’s, sometimes badly overloaded but always very skillfully finding the way between all those rocks. We learn that the way to Bou Sra is still longer than the way back to Sen Monorom. Furthermore the road is getting tougher from here. And it is very unlikely we find somebody there who can fix the bike.

One of those guys stops for some time and Pongro borrows some tools and wire in order to try fixing the moto. The Phnong guy joins and for some time they try hard. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that this won’t work out.

This is where we got stuck.

My stand is about to break off.

So we agree that I go back to Sen Monorom, get the clutch cable and tools, get my stand fixed and get back with a mechanic. Since I know the way by now I find it easier to ride it. And enjoyable not having to wait for other people. It takes me just about 20 minutes to reach the guesthouse. I cannot use the stand anymore and it takes me some time to find a tree to lean the bike against it. I get the spare parts and tools and ride to the garage close to the market. When I arrive I cannot see any tree to lean my bike against. So I just stop in front of the shop in which about a dozen people is working. After some time I manage to explain that the stand is broken and I prepare to explain that another bike needs to be fixed half way to Bou Sra.

This is when my stand is being fixed.

Meanwhile I talk to the guy in the black jacket who seems to be the only person speaking some English. When he understands the situation he indicates he would not mind giving me company and fixing the bike. And he is confident that he will manage to do it. His name is actually Bun Tach. While I suggest that he should get another bike he is in favor of going together on my bike. However, I think I don’t want to risk other peoples’ live and at the same time prefer to risk my life myself. So we agree to go with two motos and after my stand is fixed we ride to his house to get his bike. While waiting I talk to his uncle, who is working for the governments’ Seila Programme (decentralization) which I am reasonable familiar with.

Later we get petrol and start going. We are moving not so fast, as it is difficult for Bun Tach’s small bike to make this way without being damaged. After only about 10 minutes his tire is flat and we spend about 30 minutes fixing it.

Where we got stuck is very close to Pouloung village.

When we reach Pongro he has been waiting for about two hours. It does not take Bun Tach long to replace the clutch cable.

We manage to convince Bun Tach to give us company to Bou Sra. It is already afternoon and initially we are not sure whether we should still go to Bou Sra. After all, even without problems it is not likely that we will be back before it is dark. Yet we decide to go.

This is after only 200 m. We are standing in front of a creek. Three Phnong people in a huge, old Soviet style car cross our way and we talk to them for some time.

We still have to cross this water. The Phnong guys try to show us where in the water we would be able to cross without getting stuck. Bun Tach follows their advice carefully and makes it with his small bike. Pongro just speeds up and tries to cross the creek straight ahead. Although he hits a number of rocks he manages to get over without the bike being down or the engine turning off. I try carefully to do it the Phnong way but I hit a rock and get stuck. I manage to restart in the water but it takes me some time until I have the bike free again.

We continue riding. Some stretches are in better shape and it is possible to go with higher speeds, but those stretches are usually rather short. Most of the time we are moving slowly finding our way between rocks, trees and countless old and hard tracks of Soviet style trucks.

Sometimes I wonder how even four wheel vehicles are able to go this way.

This is the next major obstacle. It is like a creek, not with water but with mud. We manage to find a way around it.

This is one of those Soviet style trucks. Those vehicles leave deep furrows in the road, like upfront, giving people on bikes a hard time.

This is in Sreiomboum village. Bun Tach leaves his bike here and we continue with two bikes, as he is afraid of breaking his.

We keep riding and the road does not get any better. After maybe 20 minutes we reach the next river.

I am irresolutely about how to cross this river. Before I can ask Bun Tach, Pongro tells me ‘just watch me’. Bun Tach gets on his bike and Pongro speeds up straight ahead.

This is when they are still riding.

However, before they reach the middle of the river they hit a rock and the bike falls. However, both manage not to fall into the water. However, Pongro seems to be quite frustrated. He does not care for the bike and leaves it to Bun Tach to get it out of the water, while he just walks over. I decide not to try this and just walk my moto over, cooling down myself and the engine. From now on Bun Tach is riding the other moto and he does so very well. In fact he is 23 years old and just finished his studies at a good school in Phnom Penh. While he lived there he was riding big motos actively. Now he moved to Mondulkiri to support his uncle who is official in the provincial government. And he has a sweet heart who is working in one of the guesthouses.

We continue the journey on the other bank, where we find a particularly difficult stretch of the way. It looks easy on the picture but really is nasty to right uphill, because it is very steep and extremely bumpy. It is not far from here where we meet the only tourist that we come across today.

From here it is still like half an hour. Finally we park the motos in the jungle and walk down to the river, where we find Bou Sra waterfalls. The sun has already left the place.

This is the upper waterfall.

This is the lower waterfall. Both are very powerful and high and in addition located in a natural environment of significant beauty.

We spend maybe about 20 minutes here. Frankly, the pleasure I get out of being here right now is rather limited. Although this is a beautiful place and nobody else is here I worry that we will have difficulties reaching Sen Monorom in time. Yet Bun Tach even suggests continuing our way a few kilometers to visit the indigenous village close by. I feel a bit frustrated as I belief even if we go on our way home right now we cannot make it before it is dark. Yet he is the one who should know and I decide that it does not make such a big difference at this point. And it would be nice to see the village. So we cross the river further upstream on a wooden bridge and it takes us another 15 minutes to arrive in the village. It as about to get dark and we see a number of people along the road, many of them children winking at us. We pass the village and turn around when we reach the other side. I am not sure what we are doing here. Since we don’t have time for interaction with villagers we start our way home immediately. I wonder what those people might think about our behavior. It really does not seem to make much sense just to speed through the village first in one direction and then into the other. And I fell we are maybe not behaving very sensitively here.

After we have almost reached Bou Sra again I look at my stand and find out that it is not there anymore. I lost it on the way. So we discuss briefly, I go back to the village to look along the way while Pongro and Bun Tach look around Bou Sra. With even higher speed I pass the village again, turn around at the same place and go back. I feel now those people really have reason to belief I am insane. However, I cannot find the stand. The other guys don’t find it either.

So we go on our way home. Now we are riding with fairly high speed. This is easier for me as I am riding alone on this bike. However, Bun Tach is doing very well on the other one. I must say at this point I really enjoy riding the bike and feel much more comfortable doing so, as I know the way by now. And at this point I am willing to take more risk. Many of the spots that gave me a hard time when we came turn out to be fairly easy, like the second river. Generally, had I expected this sort of terrain I would not have thought I would be able to make it. However, it actually is not that difficult and I feel much more comfortable.

When we reach the village where Bun Tach had left his moto it is almost entirely dark. He has a flat tire again and we use the time to drink some water and talk to the locals.

Phnong guy on my moto.

From here we have still more than half the total distance to Sen Monorom. And now it really is getting more difficult as it is dark and we are riding in the forest. I am being lucky in that I have two strong head lights which provide for sufficient vision. Bun Tach is doing well, as he is used to his moto and familiar with the way. Pongro has difficulties, in many instances getting stuck. He has to restart his moto many times and increasingly has difficulties to catch up. Generally, I am surprised that it turns out not to be as difficult to ride in the dark as I had expected. Still, it is tough and there is significant risk.

We are traveling faster now in the dark than we where doing earlier in the daylight. Yet it takes us until almost 7 pm until we reach Sen Monorom.

Pongro tells me later that this trip was a very bad experience for him. He fall a number of times and was sick of getting hurt. I had underestimated that he had only few opportunities to ride big motos. In addition, our activity here really does not seem to match Pongro’s expectations.

This evening we have a heated discussion about the future of indigenous peoples. Talking about their religions Pongro mentions that there are in fact spirits in the trees and so on. When we crossed the second river, he said a bad word and Bun Tach told him to be careful, as people get lost in this area quite frequently precisely for doing that. Apparently, both of them take this more serious than I would have expected. I learn spirits can misguide people who get lost for many days in the jungle and sometimes do not resurface again. I figure Pongro might have been quite afraid when we where riding back at night, he getting stuck and falling behind significantly many times.

Although there are still countless activities and attractions to discover we decide to travel back to Phnom Penh the next day. Frankly, I would have like to stay longer, but as Pongro did not talk to me much anymore and apparently has no interest in what is meaningful activity to me I do not see a better solution.

Tomorrow I will travel to Cambodia again, so I assume I start posting articles again.

This is the research report:

Research Report: Indigenous Peoples and Decentralization in Cambodia

Content

1. Rationale and Research Design 2
1. Research Objective 2
2. Why Decentralization and Indigenous Peoples? 2
3. Research Design and Methodology 3
2. Research Results: Access 4
1. Poverty 4
2. Education 5
3. Health 6
4. Participation 7
5. Access 7
3. Research Results: Culture 8
1. Language 8
2. Perpetuation of Indigenous Culture 9
3. Institutions 11
4. Decentralization 13
4. Conclusions 14
5. Recommendations 15

1. Rationale and Research Design
1. Research Objective
This research project has been conducted to examine the relationship between indigenous peoples and decentralization in Cambodia. This research report documents, processes, and analyses the information yielded in interviews during field work. Therefore it does not include arguments relevant to the subject but based in considerations outside the empirical part of the study. Consequently, recommendations in this paper are limited to measures that appear plausible in the light of the empirical results.

This research report will be complemented by a final report. The final report will review the literature and put the empirical part into the context of the international debate on the cultural dimension of citizenship, international law and policy, and poverty reduction. The final report will include wider ranging recommendation that reflect the broader scope of the discussion and assesses the risks and chances associated with the findings.

The terms ‘indigenous peoples’, ‘highland peoples’, ‘highlanders’ are used synonymously throughout the paper. This is plausible in the light of the relevant definitions of indigenous peoples. Yet all those terms are misleading insofar as they do not reflect the diversity of languages and cultures among the various groups making up the indigenous population of Cambodia. However, a number of important characteristics are shared by all those groups. Moreover, despite the diversity of indigenous groups, the problems and challenges faced by its members vice a vice the majority population appear to be similar in many respects, including those associated with decentralization.

2. Why Decentralization and Indigenous Peoples?

It is possible to distinguish at least six reasons for paying attention to the situation of highland peoples in the context of decentralization:
a. Territorial Concentration: The majority of Cambodia’s indigenous groups, unlike other cultural minorities, lives territorially concentrated and members of those groups are said to be in the majority in two provinces (Rattanakiri and Mondulkiri). Given this pattern of territorial concentration, the devolution of power to the local level of government can provide indigenous groups with significant self-governing powers.
b. Cultural Distance: If integration and accommodation of cultural difference is relevant in the context of decentralization, than it would make sense to ask which group’s ‘cultural distance’ to the majority culture is the highest. Indigenous groups tend to have a different language and religion, like many members of various other ethnic groups. In addition, indigenous groups frequently maintain economic, social, and political institutions different from the mainstream society and are frequently distinguished by their lower level of advancement. This is reflected not least in the absence of a script. In short, if the accommodation of cultural difference is a relevant question in the context of decentralization, than the accommodation of indigenous groups is likely to be the biggest challenge.
c. International Law: Various types of groups can be distinguished according to the level to which their rights are spelled out and protected in international law. It suffices to note here that the norms in current and emerging international law with regard to indigenous peoples are both more specific and more sophisticated compared to norms applying to other groups. The same is true of specific policies that major international organizations have adapted to respect the culture and to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. In large part, the associated requirements are a matter of decentralizing relevant functions in a way that is meaningful to indigenous peoples. As those norms are becoming more influential in Cambodia it is plausible to consider and incorporate the associated requirements early into the emerging decentralization policy and its implementation.
d. National minority: Unlike many other groups, highlanders are among the most ancient inhabitants of today’s Cambodia and have formed societies with institutions in their particular language prior to being incorporated into the Cambodian nation-state. By virtue of forming a national minority indigenous groups have a legitimate claim to self-management stronger than other groups, which would have to be accommodated in decentralization policy.
e. Poverty Reduction: Members of indigenous groups are among the poorest members of Cambodia’s society. To the extent that decentralization is meant to eradicate poverty in its various dimensions, it is plausible to pay particular attention to the segments of societies where poverty is most persistent.
f. Social Capital and Decentralization: Indigenous peoples can be characterized as groups which did not attempt to centralize political power and participate in the process of state formation. Typically, indigenous peoples have developed and maintained a decentralized mode of social organization. In contrast to other cultural groups in Cambodia, highland people’s social organization is decentralized, members have a strong sense of shared values and communities have developed and maintained strong and effective institutions of local governance. Those institutions can be seen as valuable social capital, with critical importance in the process of development. While decentralization can be seen as attempt to build social capital by creating effective institutions of local governance, it is plausible to pay attention to highlanders whose culture and tradition is distinguished not least by the existence of such institutions. For decentralization to ‘tap’ this social capital and its potential contribution to local development it is important to understand and accommodate those institutions.

3. Research Design and Methodology

This research primarily used semi-structured interviews with members of various indigenous groups as well as members of commune councils. Interviews were conducted in the provinces of Kratie, Rattanakiri, and Stung Treng with most interviewees from the Jorai, Kraveth, Kreung, Kuy, Lun and Stieng groups. The selection of interviewees was done using criteria associated with the ethnic composition of the constituency. Since reliable data about the ethnic identity of citizens is not available, the selection of communes and villages was done in consultation with provincial government staff. Interviews took place during July and August, when strong rains make access to particular places very difficult and time consuming. As it is frequently the remotest areas which are inhabited by highlanders the selection tended to favor communities in less remote areas due to various constraints.

Interviews were based on a number of guiding questions designed to explore various aspects of the relationship between indigenous peoples and decentralization. Those questions address various dimensions of this relationship, such as participation in decentralized institutions, dissemination of information, ability to participate meaningfully in Khmer, attitudes towards and understanding of the functions of the commune council, interethnic relationships between members of different ethnic groups, relationship between traditional indigenous institutions and newly empowered decentralized institutions, access to and costs of services and participation.

In most cases the interviewees were either entirely members of the same indigenous village or of the same commune council. Interviews usually began with open questions about the situation in the community/ commune, the history of the group(s), changes in the indigenous culture and the like. The discussion was kept as open as possible allowing for issues to be raised in its course. This usually yielded good participation after a few initial questions.

Later in the course of the discussion more specific questions were asked which require closer attention. Particularly interesting information was gained by asking to rank different cultural groups in terms of its member’s level of access to health, education and participation, level of poverty, cost and level participation, level of understanding of commune affairs and the like. Follow up questions were asked to explore the meaning of poverty and access and to identify perceived obstacles to development and decentralization. Using rankings to measure and compare poverty and access solves a number of problems. There is controversy about what exactly constitutes poverty. Definitions have been changing over the decades and reflect different approaches to development and poverty reduction. Asking constituents themselves allows learning about and operating with definitions and measures meaningful to the persons affected by poverty. In addition, ranking is a simple concept, allowing for meaningful translation.

It lies in the nature of the project that the linguistic circumstances pose a special challenge to the conduct of meaningful interviews. Interviews took place mostly in Khmer, running the risk of failing the linguistic challenge which is the very subject of this research. However, interviews were conducted in a way that allowed for translation and clarification. The extent and quality of participation suggests that interviews yielded meaningful and valid results.

2. Research Results: Access

1. Poverty

In virtually every commune visited members of indigenous groups are the poorest constituents. Regardless of the ethnic composition of the constituency, in virtually every case the ranking of groups in terms of poverty indicated that members of indigenous groups are the poorest. Furthermore, the neediest persons are found among members of indigenous groups. At the same time, indigenous communities exhibit lower levels of inequality compared to other communities. In discussions the poverty of indigenous communities was attributed to a number of causes, among them the low efficiency of the mode of production, the ‘lacking mind for business and profit’, and natural and geographic features of the areas inhabited by indigenous peoples. On occasion, non-indigenous interviewees stressed that indigenous communities have great development potentials in terms of resources and institutions, but do not utilize those potentials.

2. Education

The level of and access to education was ranked lowest for members of indigenous groups compared to members of other ethnic groups in virtually any commune visited. This judgment was shared by members of both indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Most of the time this is simply because there is no school in areas inhabited by highlanders. In those cases the community was typically actively trying to establish a school but frequently did not reach the numbers of students and/or the financial contribution necessary to mobilize funding. In rarer cases the physical infrastructure was in place but teachers were not available. Interestingly, there were a small number of communes where members of the local indigenous group were trained during the times of Sihanouk and Pol Pot and now working in the government education system. As a result, the availability of education is significantly better in those areas. In addition, it appears that those teachers represent an important link between the state system and local communities

The priority of having education available was stressed more often by members of indigenous groups than by members of other ethnic groups. Most of the time it was explicitly education in Khmer that was asked for. However, the incorporation of local language and knowledge was seen as beneficial. The relationship between education and political representation was stressed during several interviews. Interviewees pointed out on various occasions that member of indigenous groups have difficulties interacting with government because of their low level of education and knowledge of Khmer. Interviewees stressed that the provision of better schooling would allow electing better qualified people who represent more successfully the group’s interests and manage local development more effectively.

Education is linked not only to representation but to participation as well. People who are illiterate in Khmer tend to have difficulties to understand council affairs and therefore tend to feel incapable of participating in its discussions. Furthermore, there were indications that children of indigenous groups are scared or afraid of going to school, particularly in areas where they form a minority in class.

Lacking education is linked to poverty in many ways: poor parents cannot afford not to have children working in the field. After all, work in the field provides short terms tangible benefits while the benefit of education is long term and associated with more uncertainty. Poverty makes it a rational choice for parents not to send children to school. To the extent that members of indigenous groups are poorer than members of other groups this mechanism will affect their opportunities and choices more severely. On the other hand, opportunities increasingly depend on the level of formal education, particularly on literacy in Khmer. It follows that the limited or disadvantaged access to education in Khmer is likely to widen the existing gaps in disfavor of indigenous groups, reinforcing both the low level of education and the poverty of its members.

However, while this mechanism generally affects members of any cultural group there are more specific disadvantages faced only by members of indigenous groups. Education is not a culturally neutral undertaking. It is not only the level of availability of education but its content and particularly the language in which education is provided which matters here. In Cambodia, education is conducted entirely in Khmer where it is available. It is designed nationally without the involvement of indigenous communities. It does not give recognition to indigenous languages, cultures or knowledge and does not consider the different cultural, economic, and social circumstances of indigenous groups. The playing field on which students with different languages compete when education is delivered in the native language of one some students is not even. And this puts members of indigenous groups at a disadvantage which is not faced by members of the cultural majority. The only exception in this research was a number of schools in Rattanakiri that form pilot projects and are run by NGO’s in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. The lacking recognition is in large part a linguistic problem but not entirely so. The knowledge base of formal education is exclusive in that it neglects indigenous language and knowledge. Even in a scenario in which the access to education is similar for members of indigenous groups they would still face a serious disadvantage if the education available does not respond to specific educational needs and is culturally and linguistically exclusive. The more trivial consequence is that the content of education is not as relevant for members of indigenous groups and therefore of lower value. More seriously, by neglecting indigenous language and culture formal education conveys a sense of cultural or intellectual inferiority and is likely to undermine the self-respect of individual members of indigenous groups.

Thus members of indigenous groups tend to be disadvantaged in the field of education not only by the limited access to education but by the fact that it is provided entirely in Khmer. Moreover, education that does not recognize the cultural membership of its subjects tends to convey a sense of cultural inferiority and threatens the perpetuation of the local knowledge base. A case could be made that for education not to disadvantage members of indigenous groups it would not only have to be equally available but in addition would have to take indigenous language and knowledge into account.

3. Health

The emerging pattern with respect to access to health parallels the picture in the field of education. The provision of health services was among the top priorities in most indigenous communities while the access for their members is most limited due to various and interdependent causes. Members of indigenous groups live territorially dispersed in areas where health services are usually not available or where accessing those services is associated with unrealistic distances and costs. In contrast, Khmer (and, in some areas, ethnic Lao) tend to settle concentrated in or close to district towns, where health facilities are easily accessible. To varying degrees indigenous villagers expressed confidence in modern medicine, while traditional medicine continues to be practiced. It was pointed out that the worst and most pervasive suffering in the community stems from the absence of health services. On occasion a feeling of neglect was expressed by members of indigenous groups during interviews.

In many cases members of indigenous communities do not qualify in terms of the required numbers to get support for the establishment of health centers. At the same time most of them live to far away to access the existing facilities. Accordingly, the costs (mostly in terms of transportation) of accessing health services are the highest for indigenous groups while they are the poorest members of the constituency. Yet the value of the available health services might not be the same, since those services and the way they are provided are frequently at odds with traditional medicine and belief systems.

4. Participation

Participation in the commune council is generally constraint by the same obstacles that limit highlander’s access to services. The council office is in many cases more remote and more difficult to reach due to settlement patterns, absence of infrastructure and the geographical features. Yet unlike in schools and health facilities, highlanders appear in many areas the most active participants in the commune council. The contrast was frequently striking in councils with a constituency of different cultural groups. Moreover, councilors in several communes emphasized that members of indigenous groups in particular are not only the most patient participants, but very sincere and honest in their commitment to local development projects. Yet in other councils the overwhelming obstacles to accessing the council office prevent some communities systematically from attending meetings or make it an extremely time and money consuming exercise. Only in rare cases participants suggested that information was not sufficiently available to participate in council affairs. In many cases interviewees indicated that language is not a major obstacle to participation.

5. Access

In general the following turns out to be the obstacle to equal access to public services: Whereas the non-indigenous population tends to live territorially concentrated in or close to district or provincial towns, members of indigenous groups live spread over the country in places where transportation is not easily available. Moreover, in many areas indigenous groups live in unstable settlements, moving after a few years to another place. Regulations for building schools, health centers and the like require certain numbers of users which frequently cannot be reached in thinly populated areas. In addition, unstable settlement pattern pose a special challenge to the provision of services. For example, constructing a modern school building in remote areas in order to make education available is associated with significant costs. Yet when the community moves to a different place the benefit of this investment might diminish. Providing services the way they are provided in other parts of the country is associated with uncertainty and risk as long as communities continue moving. This uncertainty was stressed by various government officials as among the most significant obstacles to development projects in indigenous communities. Interviews suggest there is a tendency to neglect development projects in areas inhabited by highlanders and that this tendency is mirrored in the behavior of NGO’s. For example, if a potential donor is considers financing a vaccination program, it is not clear whether members of indigenous groups will be available for the second shot. Similarly, if an NGO wants to contribute a road they will be careful providing it for indigenous communities. If the community decides to move the benefit of the road will diminish. Commitments to indigenous groups, particularly at the district integration workshop, might be avoided because development benefits are perceived as uncertain.

Yet a case could be made that highlanders are provided with the same opportunities as everybody, free to settle or to move to urban centers in order to improve their access to service facilities. And free to capitalize on emerging opportunities to alleviate individual poverty. In this view, measures designed to specifically benefit indigenous peoples would constitute an unjust priviledge. After all, why should the society subsidize highlander’s expensive preferences to live remote and widely scattered? This argument misses the value of cultural membership for the individual and the persistence of cultural identity. People do not choose their culture. In particular, people do not choose their native language. Language is not a matter of preference. Cultural membership appears to be the intervening variable in other areas where highlanders face limited access. Settlement pattern for example, are due to economic and religious practice, that is, culturally determined.

In any council visited highlander’s access to public services and to participation is most limited compared to the rest of the population. The available services are generally provided exclusively in Khmer, limiting access and participation to constituents capable of operating in Khmer. Without recognition and inclusion of the local language and knowledge the value of health and educational services is likely to be lower for highland peoples.

3. Research Results: Culture

1. Language

Interviews tended to take place not in the more remote indigenous villages, where the level of understanding of the official language is said to be significantly lower. Yet, in virtually any commune visited, the local, indigenous language is the first language children learn at home. It remains the mother language and is in most cases the only language used for interaction in the village and between members of the same linguistic groups within the council.

Khmer is commonly used in commune councils and almost exclusively when there is only a minority of indigenous peoples in the constituency. Even when there is a strong majority of highlanders the council is likely to operate in Khmer. During this research there were only two councils where interviewees indicated that the local language is used in deliberations rather than Khmer. The constituencies of both councils consist almost exclusively of members of the same indigenous group.

Where there is a relatively small minority of one or more indigenous groups in the constituency, Khmer is likely to be used not only for discussion in the council but in the interaction between the council and the indigenous constituency and for the dissemination of information on the village level.

The degree to which members of indigenous groups understand Khmer varies widely. In almost any location visited during this research project it is mostly women and the elderly who have a more limited command of Khmer language. Yet in many indigenous villages, interviewees indicated that most constituents understand enough Khmer to participate in commune affairs. Moreover, a sufficient number of people are said to be capable of translating for those who do not understand. Yet in other cases it was stressed that the local language should be used for interaction between the commune council and the indigenous constituency. In rare cases interviewees suggested that the understanding of council affairs depends critically on whether or issues are explained in local language.

Again, deliberation of development projects on the community level take place mostly in local language. And this is where it matters for decentralization. It is here where the constituency is supposed to deliberate and determine the course of the community’s development. Yet the result of those deliberations will ultimately have to be translated into Khmer. It needs to be recognized that significant political power is associated with this ‘linguistic interface’, which is likely to become a major bottleneck for both participation and dissemination of information. There are particular difficulties to the translation in the case of indigenous languages. This is due to the absence of a script as well as to the fact that indigenous languages reflect a way of life significantly different from Khmer culture. Indigenous languages do not know many concepts which are relevant to decentralization policy.

2. Perpetuation of Indigenous Culture

The history of highlander groups is preserved and handed down through myths, legends, and songs by elders. Due to its oral nature indigenous culture is manifested in songs and stories rather than in written texts and those oral traditions make up the cultural memory of the group. Indigenous cultures and languages are particularly vulnerable to be lost in the absence of a script. Since culture is given down orally it will be lost as soon as one generation fails to pass it to the next. In many instances the threat of cultural, particularly linguistic, marginalization and extinction of groups appears to be not only a real possibility dramatically close to happen. In one instance there was said to be only one old and confused persons left in the community who still knew the old songs and stories.

The importance of preserving indigenous culture was stressed by members of virtually every indigenous community visited during this research project. Maintaining indigenous culture, religion and language and the perpetuation to the next generation is seen as a matter of great concern. Yet there is uncertainty how the associated practices can be perpetuated to the next generations. And it was subject to regret that substantial elements of what used to constitute local culture are felt to be lost. The most obvious aspects of change regard aspects of material culture. Modern dress is worn rather than traditional clothing, young people dance to pop music rather than traditional dances, and wooden ‘Khmer’ houses are being built rather than bamboo houses in traditional styles. Those changes on the surface mirror less obvious dimensions of recent and radical change, prominently the erosion of the spirit of ‘togetherness’ and ‘sharing happiness’.

On many occasions the difference between the modernization of life styles and culture on one hand and the loss of culture on the other was stressed. It is clearly felt that modernization poses challenges to indigenous culture but mostly assumed that it is not necessary to loose the cultural identity with development. Those changes and the general development are mostly not considered as posing a disadvantage specifically to members of indigenous groups. In most cases members of indigenous groups indicated that they feel to be the agents of their culture’s change.

The judgment of recent and dramatic changes is complex. In general, people accept and frequently embrace the changes associated with modernization that have been taking place. There does seem to be a different perception depending on the age of the person in question. It is typically the older members of the community who are more concerned about the preservation and perpetuation of culture, whereas young people tend to embrace changes associated with modernization more and care less for tradition.

Members of various indigenous groups expressed their appreciation of their particular culture. Most indigenous interviews stated to be proud to be member of the respective indigenous group. This sense of proudness has various sources, among them prominently the practice of solidarity, unity, and honesty. And it appears to be a sense of shared history and great achievements and deeds in ancient times. Interestingly, on various occasions it was stressed by the interviewees that members of the respective indigenous group have contributed to establish Angkor Wat.

On occasion members of indigenous groups suggested that they should be represented on higher levels of government, to have a voice in the design of national policies that affect them as well as to create awareness of indigenous culture. It was stressed that highlanders want their cultures to be known and in fact ask for recognition of their cultural identity. On occasion this was combined with the request to the government to provide information and education in a way that promotes the local indigenous culture within and outside the group. In rare instances this was demanded by claiming the equal right to public positions and offices that members of the majority ethnic group take for granted. Most of the time the demand for recognition takes the form of requesting the government to permit and provide for indigenous self-representation. Members of indigenous groups appear to feel that they do have neither the right nor the capability to create their own representation. Lacking knowledge of the official language is seen as one of the major obstacles to proper political representation.

Observation and interviews indicate that members of various indigenous groups try to hide their ethnic identity. This was the case particularly in areas where indigenous peoples form a minority of the population. But even in areas with a majority of highlanders there where many indications that members of indigenous groups feel ashamed of their cultural membership. For outsiders it is frequently impossible to recognize individuals as members of indigenous groups. Yet this identity appears to be persistent and of high social relevance. If highlanders feel induced to hide their identity outside the group this indicates serious obstacles to the individual’s self respect.

3. Institutions

In general, many indigenous communities posses and share various strong institutions. The most obvious examples are elders, who command considerable respect within the respective community. Elders serve many important social, political and spiritual functions within the group. There is a variety of other local institutions, in particular various schemes to assist each other with labor and resources, such as maintaining a collective store or field to balance individual risks and support needy members of the community. Members of many indigenous groups proud themselves of their strong sense of solidarity and sharing. The honesty of indigenous villagers and the sincerity of their solidarity and commitments were recognized on several occasions by their Khmer neighbors.

Where elders exist as an institution they are the center of traditional authority within the group. They are chosen by various procedures aiming at consensus within the community. Elders serve multiple functions within the group, associated with leadership, decision making, mediation, and religious affairs. Their knowledge of the group’s history, legends and songs is of central importance for the intergenerational perpetuation of culture, particularly in the absence of a script. Where elders exist there is a variety of levels to which they are involved in council affairs. It is a common attitude among councilors that elders do not have to play a role in interacting with the council. However, there was a number of examples where elders where explicitly invited and encouraged to keep involved in council affairs.

Respect for the commune council was said to be as high as respect for traditional institutions. The council’s authority appears to be widely accepted and it is well understood that this institution is backed by law. In most cases interviewees stated that there are no conflicts between elders, village chiefs and the council. The mode of interaction appears to be cooperative and there is a functioning division of labor.

Strong leadership and respect for decisions is characteristic for the way elders govern the community. Despite this leadership style decisions emphasize consensus and decision making and conflict resolution involves mediation and negotiation. Village elders are the first instance of resolution when conflicts between individuals arise. Elders are said to have lost authority in many communities over the last decades but are still an effective institution in conflict resolution. Traditional selection procedures and leadership style were justified and defended mostly in terms of democracy and fairness. During the interviews there was no indication that group leaders would consider restricting the liberties of group members in order to maintain some sort of cultural purity.

There does not generally appear to be the perception of a conflict between tradition institutions and state institutions. Commune affairs are perceived to be of formal and legal nature while traditional institutions and leadership are associated with virtue, tradition and wisdom. It was acknowledged during interviews that every citizen has to follow legal rules. Members of indigenous groups are well aware of their Cambodian citizenship. Yet dealing with government is regarded difficult.

In general, policy towards indigenous communities tends to reflect the common attitude that indigenous culture has to adapt to the operations of institutions of the mainstream society. This is associated with the understanding that avoiding discrimination is sufficient to do justice to members of indigenous minorities. However, non-discrimination is defined precisely in terms of equal access to institutions operating in the majority language. Non-discrimination provides members of the majority with a priviledge and puts highlanders at a disadvantage. It appears advisable and desirable to adapt decentralization policy to existing indigenous institutions and carefully integrate those institutions within the framework of decentralization. Involving those institutions in development projects is likely to serve two important purposes: it would be an effective means of targeting the poorest members of the Cambodian society with poverty reduction. At the same time it would strengthen and promote the institutions in question and thus contribute to the preservation and perpetuation of indigenous cultures.

4. Decentralization

Attitudes towards decentralization and the commune council were generally positive. When asked for the specific benefits decentralization has brought villagers where always able to list a number of projects and achievements. This was the case regardless of the ethnic identity of the interviewees. However, the demand for more training and education in decentralization was stressed in many interviews, by councilors as well as by constituents. On a few occasions it was expressed that the council does not have the power to solve the fundamental problems, particularly associated with land and forest. There is a strong tendency for indigenous communities to be underrepresented in the commune council. In many cases, the share of indigenous councilors tends to be smaller than highlanders share of the constituency. This is particularly the case where highland people form a minority in the commune.

There was no case were members of the District/Provincial Facilitation Teams (PFT/DFT) had been members of a local indigenous group. The recruitment procedures vary from province to province. The positions are filled mostly with members of existing government agencies and it appears to be impossible for highlanders to reach the technical expertise and experience required for this job. At the same time, current members of PFT/DFT do not appear to learn the local language. Frequently the difficulties of having to facilitate decentralization without knowledge of the local language was stressed by members of PFT/DFT. Frequently they were surprised by the fact that highlanders actually persist to have a language quite different from Khmer and impossible for the them to understand. A common attitude among PFT/DFT was that highlander’s lack of education, particular lack of knowledge in Khmer is a serious obstacle to the implementation of decentralization policy. The solution was usually seen in providing education in Khmer language to indigenous communities.

4. Conclusions

Research results indicate that decentralization has improved the living conditions of indigenous communities in many communes. Decentralization has brought health facilities, schools, roads, wells, and bridges. Accordingly, attitudes towards decentralized institutions of government are positive. In addition, decentralization has given indigenous groups a voice in local affairs in many communes which they did not have before. And it is here where decentralization has contributed to the accommodation of indigenous peoples.

Major gaps between indigenous communities and other communities continue to exist in terms of poverty and access to education and health services. Members of indigenous groups face significant disadvantages in the spheres of education and health. Some of those disadvantages are shared by members of communities which are not indigenous, such as the difficulties of accessing services in remote and thinly populated areas. Yet many disadvantages are exclusively faced by members of indigenous groups. This is in large part a matter of language. Services and education are provided in Khmer and exclude local language, culture and knowledge.

In this regard, decentralization did not contribute much to the accommodation of indigenous groups. More precisely, decentralization does not utilize the potential it has to accommodate indigenous communities. Members of indigenous groups are not provided with the opportunity to participate in their language in most commune councils, even when they form a majority of the constituency. Members of the majority culture can participate in decentralized institutions anywhere in the country in their native language. In council elections, the choice for indigenous groups is limited to members capable of functioning in institutions operating in Khmer, while members of the majority culture can freely choose their leaders among themselves. Positions associated with decentralized institutions are only disproportional occupied by members of indigenous groups.

A strong contrast was found between communes with a majority of highlanders and communes with a minority of highlanders. Due to their different cultural identity and way of life the needs of indigenous peoples can deviate significantly from those of the mainstream society. In communes with a strong majority of highlanders, decentralized institutions provide groups with a voice in the political process, allowing for distinctive needs and interest to be represented and considered while there was virtually no such representation in the political system before. In addition, commune councils provide members of those communities with the possibility to take part in decisions that affect their lives and serves as important instrument of self management.

In contrast, research suggests that decentralization did not contribute much to development of indigenous communities where members form a minority in the commune. Where there are specific indigenous needs they are not likely to be addressed when priorities are determined by majority decisions. This situation is permanent, since a minority of highlanders in the constituency won’t become a majority at any point. Majority decisions are likely to become a mechanism which reinforces the poverty and disadvantaged situation of highlanders where they form a minority in the commune, further widening the existing gaps between the members of different ethnic groups.

5. Recommendations

a. The public recognition of the use of indigenous languages in commune councils where indigenous peoples form a majority is desirable for various reasons. It would ensure that dissemination and participation takes place in a meaningful manner and would make it more likely that decentralized institutions work for members of indigenous groups. This measure would merely mean the formalization of patterns which are already operating on the ground.
b. Meaningful provisions have to be found to accommodate the needs of members of indigenous groups where they are in the minority in the constituency of the commune council. This is likely to involve their native language. For dissemination of information and participation to be informed and meaningful it cannot but take place in the native language of the constituents in question.
c. Position and offices associated with institutions of local governance should be given to members of indigenous groups where members of those groups are part of the constituency. This is particularly true of commune councilors, council clerks, and PFT/DFT. The requirement of literacy in Khmer for those positions should be handled very flexible. It is worth considering whether knowledge of the majority language should be among the requirements where members of indigenous groups are in the majority. It is very unlikely that people not familiar with the cultural and linguistic environment effectively manage affairs of local governance. In contrast, locally recruited persons have proven to both committed to the development of their communities as well as capable of effectively contributing to it.
d. Provisions have to be found to provide meaningful translation, particular where participation takes place in the local language. For the time being it is reasonable that elected commune councilors are in charge for the translation, since they have the strongest incentives to be responsive to the needs and demands of the constituency.
e. Where possible, indigenous institutions should be strengthened in the framework of decentralization. Examples include elders and mechanism of mutual support. Indigenous institutions are likely to operate very effectively in the framework of decentralized local government.
f. Any attempt to both alleviate poverty of members of indigenous groups as well as to preserve and promote indigenous culture faces the lack of human resources. Strategically, the lack of indigenous capacity appears to be the major obstacle to carefully targeted development projects. As long as this situation persist it is likely that attempts to promote members of indigenous groups do not benefit them directly. And it remains uncertain whether parts of those benefits will trickle down to the intended addressees. For members of indigenous groups to become the agents of their cultural and social change it is of utmost importance to target members of those groups particularly with culturally appropriate education and training and involve them in the design of those measures.

We meet this guy and than drive together another thirty minutes before we reach the place where we take a boat.

This is on the way.

From here we take a boat. Unfortunately, this village is accessible only by boat.

Behind the bridge is the Mekong River.

This is on the boat.

There is not much traffic on the river and not much going on at the banks either.

This is Reaksa with the Councilor.

After about 40 minutes we reach the village, which is inhabited by Phnong people.

This is one of the huts which are hold in high regards by various groups of indigenous peoples for reasons that I did not yet entirely understand.

In the village.

People here did not know that we would come. So it takes some time to find and inform people. However, people are very willing to participate and after maybe 30 minutes we sit together in this hut and have an interview.

I should mention that this is one of the poorest villages I have seen. There is a girl of about 8 years laying in the background who has 41 degree fever. We talk to her mother and learn that she had ten children. Five of them died, one of them last month. She and her husband borrowed a lot of money to pay for medicine that did not work out. Now her husband went to the mountains to cut bamboo which he can sell in the market to pay back the borrowed money. He is away for about one month now and does not know both that his other child died and that the next one is sick. He took the families only mosquito net.

We have an interesting discussion which lasts about three hours. This is after our meeting.

We talk to this mother and the Councilor and decide to take her with us to the hospital in Kratie. I should mention that health services are usually not accessible for those people since they cannot afford both the transportation by boat and car and the treatment in the hospital. The councilor mentioned that needy people can visit him in his office to get a letter which tells the hospital to treat the person without charge. However, few people get such a letter since the office of the Commune Council is far away and since even with a letter treatment is expensive.

The woman to the left is the mother of the sick girl, which is the one with the mat in her hands left to the women.

For some reasons baby chicken are painted in various colors.

This is the center of this village.

On the boat again.

This is how bamboo is transported from the mountains. Sticks are bound together and a boat pulls those bundles down the river. The price for those bamboo sticks increases the closer it comes to the capital. At this point the price is about 120 Riel (3 Cent). In Kratie the price is about 200 Riel (5 Cent).

Going back to Kratie involves some time, since we are more people than can fit in the car. First we go to the office of the Commune Council to get a letter or recommendation for the hospital. Than we go all the way to Kratie with the mother and two of her children. In the hospital it takes us some time (and despite the letter quite some money) to make sure the child is treated.

On the way I took this picture of the CPP provincial headquarter.

Later we meet with two people from an international NGO at the riverside. We had an interview with the lady which was not so much about indigenous peoples yet fairly interesting. The other guy is researching on projects to reduce the density of the sort of mosquito that causes dengue fever. He is from I forgot which European country. Of course both of them spoke English which gave me the rare opportunity to talk to people directly.

However, Reaksa, my translator brings one of his friends who wants to visit the villages. I met this guy the other day and he turned out to be a converted Christian working for Seven Day Adventist. We had a long discussion about religion in which I tried to make the case for Buddhism while he is preaching the gospel trying to persuade me that there is only one god. Although this is entertaining I feel this guy is a believing crusader. And I have seen and heard about many Christian organizations particularly in Rattanakiri trying to make indigenous peoples change their culture and give up their superstitious beliefs. I do not think that this is the most urgent think they need at this point.

Given this situation and the fact that nobody bothers to tell me what exactly he wants to do there I cannot but make very clear that I am more than happy to give him a ride. However, what will not happen is that he participates in interview. And I tell him that the bible will remain in the car and that he won’t preach the gospel at any rate in the village where we conduct interviews. The bottom line is I do not want missionaries to interfere with my research. We have some argument and after I explain my reason I get some limited agreement.

Soon we are in the car and back on the road again.

This is the first village we visit, inhabited by Phnom people. Phnong is the indigenous group with that has the highest number of members in Cambodia, most likely representing the majority of the population of Mondulkiri. We have an interview of far more than 3 hours which is in some ways slow and indirect but yields very helpful information. And I like those people a lot.

The bamboo rack attached to this house is where we have our meeting.

The village is located directly at the main road and from time to time all sorts of vehicles pass by.

Then we move to meet with people in another village. The villages we visit today are not exactly close to the provincial capital and getting there involves some hours of driving. This is somewhere on the way.

This is the district office of Snuol district where we are supposed to meet the governor and pick up somebody you can guide us to the next village. However, the governor is not available and the other guy is busy, too.

We have lunch before we try again.

However, even after we had lunch nobody is available. So we find somebody to instruct the driver and go on our own.

This is the pagoda in the town where we are supposed to meet the villagers.

We stop at the Commune Council and find possible more than 80 persons of about any age. Moreover, we learn that they have been waiting for us and that it was far more than 100 people when they arrived in the morning. Somebody had told them to be available in the morning and they had been waiting here all day on very limited space, in the heat of the day and without food. I thought this is really terrible and am not sure how to deal with the situation. However, people do not appear to be resentful. Somebody suggests that we should meet in the pagoda, since the space in the Council office is too limited. And so we walk over to the pagoda.

First I am not sure how to appropriately start a meaningful discussion under those circumstances. Not only have these people been waiting the entire day. In addition, I did not expect to conduct an interview with about 60 persons. However, after only some minutes of initial uncertainty people turn out to be active and interested participants and we have a pretty long and pretty rich discussion.

After the interview is over we wonder how we can appropriately compensate people for the long waiting time. Although we know about the limitations of giving money we decide that at least everybody should get 500 Riel (12 Cent) which is about the price for instant noodles, which are quite common here. I feel bad about giving money and giving only a very small amount. However, people take it very serious, carefully counting persons and distributing money.

This is when the meeting is over.

On the way back to Kratie we pass this wooden pagoda.

I did mention that Cambodia is a rural country, did I?

This is when we have a break. It is still a long way to go to Kratie.

People are having a bath and buffalos too.

When we arrive it is already late. We have some lunch and then I go to bed.

We meet with the government guy (PoLA) to have breakfast together. Then we leave to go by car to meet several Councils and communities.

This is the first Commune Council we meet. I did not make clear enough the other day that I would strongly prefer to have interviews in the absence of government officials. Even a local police man is present. However, this is not as bad with regard to Councils as it would be when it comes to the community. Moreover, those officials really appeared to be entirely disinterested in the subject of the discussion. The discussion takes about three hours, much longer than we have anticipated.

This is outside the building.

This is in the village and on the way to the next commune.

This is when we have food together with the government guy and the driver in one of the towns along the major road.

This is the car – a Toyota Camry.

Major constructions are going on along this road, including new bridges.

This is the local health center or hospital. The design of this building appears to be as Khmer as it gets, very much like any other public building regardless of the ethnic composition of the local constituencies.

This is the next meeting with members of another Commune Council outside their office.

This is the Commune Councils building.

On the road again.

This is a village of an indigenous group that is particularly interesting. There are members of two indigenous groups in the constituency of the Commune. However, while members of one group (Phnong) maintain their traditional way of life, the members of this community (Kuy) seem to have integrated almost entirely into Khmer mainstream society. However, I did not get as much insights as I would have liked to. After all, this is the only indigenous group I met that is integrated to such a big extent that it does not seem to make much sense to talk about indigenous groups anymore. In fact the characteristics of this group would not qualify them as being indigenous on most definitions.

This was the last interview for today and afterwards I have a local drink at this place.

We are back on the way to Kratie town. While the sun is setting it is getting a bit cooler the road gets busier.

Youngsters are playing volleyball, just like everywhere at that time.

We have a flat tire. This is not a major problem and requires just some patience.

Of course it does not take long until we have company.

The Mekong from the balcony of the hotel in the evening.

Later I meet my translator and we have diner together. I take this picture of one of the small businesses along the road. Chewing gum, cigarettes and some fruits are being sold here.