Today I take it easy. I spend some time walking around in Chiang Mai and visiting some sites around town with a tuk tuk. One very unfortunate incidence is that the tuk tuk I am siting in hits hard an old man in the middle of the road. The man falls and is dragged along for some meters. The poor guy is down for about 5 minutes on the middle of the road obviously deeply shocked and probably also with immense pain. Then we manage to lead him to the roadside. An emergency team arrives after some time and takes him away.

It is afternoon when I meet Chingya again. Songkhran is still ongoing and we decide to join the water battle again. This time we take the moto. Chingya has brought a water canon. Obviously, I do not make the same mistake again and this time round I leave my camera at home.

The walls that circle the inner town of Chiang Mai represent a square each side of which is about 2km long. Along the wall are two roads on each side of the moat, leading in circles around the town center in opposite directions. It is here, along the moat and on the road where most water battles take place.

We take the moto and the plan is to ride one time all alongthe moat all around the town. And this is what we do. Chingya rides the bike while I target people on trucks and along the roadside. Obviously, we are frequently on the receiving end since we are an easy target in the slow traffic.

It does not take long until we reallize that some people use very cold water. We note that massive amounts of ice are sold along the road. People on trucks put huge amounts of ice into barrells of water that they refill from the moat, and many people along the road do the same. Once in a while we get a chance to refill our watercanon with icy water. It is fun because you definitely get a reaction from those you target. However, we also take substantial amounts of cold water. After the first halve of the ride we are already pretty cold. This takes about half an hour and now the sun is setting.

By the time we finish the circle around town I am shivering. Even a bath in the dirty but warm moat now seems an appealing prospect and this is what we end up having. Then we go and have food. Later I go to the guesthouse, pack my staff and leave to the airport. Nothing worth mentioning happens on the flight back to Bangkok. I take a taxi from the airport to the Central Point Hotel. By now I am familiar with the way.

I learn at the reception that I was ‘upgraded’ to a room with kitchen at the 23 floor. I don’t need a kitchen but like the view from the balcony.

I arrive in Bangkok late Friday night. My flight to Phnom Penh is on Sunday evening. As it happens, I have some problems with my computer and spent much of the weekend looking for somebody to fix it. Finally I have the battery reconditioned in a shop close by in a shopping mall. Besides, I spend some time going around in Bangkok.

This is some sort of mall for electronic and computer shops and it is here where I have my computer fixed. People sell cheaply all kinds of hard and software, music and electronics.

Today is holiday and since nobody is in the office, I decide to spend a day more like the many people who come here as tourists. The guesthouse offers a number of day trips and following the recommendation of the receptionist, I booked one of them the other day, which involves visiting Doi Inthanon, the highest mountain in Thailand (2595m), as well as a close by waterfall and hill tribe village, among others. The price is about 20US$.

We start at 8 am in the morning with a mini bus. We pick up a number of other guests before we leave the town, an elderly Thai couple, a middle aged British couple who lives in Bangkok, and two Germans in the company of a young Thai lady. Then we leave Chiang Mai to the south. It takes about 2 hours from the town to the gate of the national park in which the mountain is located. The ride is comfortable, the road is pretty good and the bus is air conditioned.

There is not much to take pictures of during the first hour of the trip. When we enter the national park, I get out my camera. However, I note that it is occasionally malfunctioning, and the frequency of these occasions increase. I attribute this behavior of my camera to the fact that it got very wet yesterday. At some point, the camera makes only nasty noises when I start it but refuses to focus or take pictures. I find this very frustrating, having the chance to be a tourist for one day and a broken camera at the same time.

This is the last picture I am able to take.

We travel through mountainous and fairly green scenery, slowly but continuously climbing up the mountain. Then we reach a huge parking lot, get out of the bus and walk the few hundred meters to the highest point in Thailand. Although this appears less impressive in practice than it sounds, I find it annoying not being able to take a picture where everybody else does.

After less than twenty minutes we get on the bus again to ride a few hundred meters to another huge parking lot. It is located next to two religious buildings (temples? Stupas?, I really don’t know)which were built recently in honor of the Queen and King respectively. Still struggling with my camera I note that it seems to come to live again. In fact I am able to take a number of shots and after some minor errors it seems to operate properly again. I am very glad and take many pictures.

This is the building dedicated to the Queen, if I am not mistaken. Both buildings are located in a huge and colorful garden which however looks a bit artificial to me.

The guide takes a picture of me.

The place is pretty crowded, partly due to the holiday, I guess.

This building is dedicated to the King. I climb up the stairs.

This is inside.

Then I walk over to the other building. I am on a tight schedule here, because the bus will be leaving after only a 30 min break.

At most of the places one does not really get the impression that this is about 2600m above sea level, maybe because the sky is overcast.

One of the artworks at the building. The scenes which are depicted here are partly pretty bloody.

This is inside the other building.

People pour water over Buddha statues and pray.

Children are performing dances when I reach the parking lot.

Then we continue the trip.

In his short statements, the guide mentions a number of times that what we see are achievements of the ‘Royal Project’. During the bus ride I ask him what this project is all about. He tells me that it aims to prevent the local indigenous groups from ‘burning down the forest’, and instead assisting in creating occupations other than traditional ones. I ask him whether he thinks that hill tribe members are happier now and he say yes. My limited experience with indigenous peoples in other countries makes me skeptical if such a project really correlates to those peoples’ aspirations.

On the way to the next sight we stop at a local market, for about 10 minutes. The whole trip is carefully scheduled. The market is an accumulation of small shacks in which members of hill tribe communities sell fruits and mostly generic artwork at low prices.

At the market.

Then we continue the trip. The next stop is a hill tribe village. The village is close to the main road.

This is in the village.

We go to one house where a group of women weaves textiles, mostly scarves, which are sold to visitors. Another group of tourists has already entered but I do not see anybody buying anything. The women do not seem very enthusiastic about their work.

The next stop is a simple, open air restaurant at the roadside, where we have lunch, which is decent.

Then we head to the next attraction. It is a waterfall. The final kilometers are pretty bumpy, but the huge parking lot is crowded with people and cars.

This is the waterfall. It is pretty high and there are substantial amounts of water involved, despite the fact that it is dry season.

We have about 30 minutes time which I use to walk around, hang out and take some pictures. Most visitors appear to be Thai and I see very few foreigners.

It is very hot, even in the shadow. Many people picknick or go for a swim.

Then we leave and head back to Chiang Mai.

On the way, we see many people with barrels of water, water pipes and water cannons, either at the road side or on the back of pick up trucks and both involved in water battles. Occasionally we come across farmers standing with massive water tubes and a water pump with a power generator – equipment that I guess on other days is used for irrigation purposes – pouring huge amounts of water over everything that travels on the road. However, the speed of the bus does not allow taking pictures.

At one point we are going slower and I can take this pictures. These guys are listening to heavy metal music, appear drunk, dance on the road and pour water over some females on a motor bike, actually close to harassment.

The closer we come to Chiang Mai, the more water battles we get to see at the road side. Everybody starts carefully wrapping belongings into plastic bags. The guide informs us that it would not be possible to enter the center of the town due the crowds of cars and people. On the final stretch we go only very slowly. People line up the road and target everything with water.

Massive amounts of buckets are sold along the road. People built chains to efficiently transport water the few meters from the moat to recipients.

This fellow tries to open my window. He fails.

Some people swim in the moat.

We are moving very slowly. At some point we stop only about 300m away from my guesthouse. I put on my rain jacket and all my stuff in the bag. I get only modestly wet on my way home.

It is still daylight, I change and leave again, with my camera wrapped in two plastic bags, looking for a dry spot from which I can take some shots of the crowd.

The inner city used to be enclosed by a wall made of brick. Some gates are still standing and so are other parts of the wall. I finally find a suitable spot on one of those parts of the wall. Two roads are following the moat in different directions, it is along those roads where most of the action takes place and this piece of wall is right in between them.

Some kids are jumping from the wall into the moat, which I find quite brave.

Then something else happens at the road side. Two motor bikes have an accident which I do not actually see. When I take notice, somebody is lying on the road without movement. I then see that a group of people is punching and kicking the person which is down already and find it quite nasty. A few meters away from me is a man with a walkie talkie who first talks to his counterpart and then walks towards the scene of the accident so I assume somebody will take appropriate action.

However, nobody seems to intervene and the mistreatment keeps going on. This incident happens actually quite at a distance and I take pictures with 10x zoom. I know somebody should intervene but feel very reluctant to do so, because what is going on is quite violent.

At some point the guy on the ground gets up, much to my surprise. It even seems to me that he tries to apologize but these fellows keep kicking and boxing him. At this point I actually record a short film which I would present here but I don’t know yet how to integrate it into this text. At any rate, finally some people appear who look like police in civilian clothes and they prevent further abuse quite effectively.

It is almost dark and I go home. Later I call Chingya. He picks me up with the motor bike in the evening. We ride around for some time and then head towards some bars that are located along the river.

There is live music in quite a number of these bars. A band is playing in the first bar we enter and I am very delighted that they play very well and very sophisticated music, too. We order drinks and listen and talk for some time and have another drink.

Later some good looking girls go on stage and dance. At this point, the band has changed, not to the better. They play mostly Thai pop with the characteristic keyboard sounds that I do not particularly like.

Later we move to another bar where we order more drinks. Chingya recommends the place because a locally famous blues guitarist plays here regularly. A band is indeed playing bluesy music, not bad but not particularly good either. It is already about 11 when the guy finally appears. He plays in fact very good and very fast but always solo and most of the time loud. Anyway, the band is pretty good for the most part and we have a great time.

It is late when we leave.

Today is Wednesday. As far as I know, this is also the first official day of Songkhran, the Thai New Year. In the morning I have a meeting with Helen in the office of the International Alliance. The office is outside of Chiang Mai and she has explained to me yesterday how to get there. However, it takes me more than 30 minutes to find the office. A number of children splashes significant amounts of water at me on my way through the city center. I like it, and by now I can manage to ride on the wrong side of the road.

Finally I find the office. We spent the morning with discussions. Later we leave to visit a party of indigenous peoples from Burma (Myanmar) who fled from their evil government to Thailand. Although Helen speaks Thai very well it takes us quite some time to find the place. Here I meet again with Chris, his wife, Jannie and Chingya. The party takes place in some sort of garden and there are about 40 or 50 people, including a life band. Most people are from Burma.

People enjoy themselves, some have drunken significant amounts of beer already, and a number of children have a lot of fun splashing water at each other and everybody else. I get to talk to some people and listen to the music and more generally enjoy being here among friendly folks.

Jannie and Chingya singing.

Chingya singing.

Indigenous refugees from Burma, slightly drunk.

Children playing with water. By now I am wet all over, like everybody else.

It is early afternoon when we decide to move to the town center and join the Songkhran celebration. First we ride to Chris’ house, where I try to put all my belongings into plastic bags. The roads are very crowded when we come closer to the town and water is splashed at us quite frequently. The inner city is closed and at some point we leave the bikes and walk.

I knew that splashing water at other people is what Songkhran is all about and that this practiced particularly in Chiang Mai. However, I am surprised about the number of people and amounts of water involved. It seems everybody is joining, locals together with Thais from other places and foreigners. The road is wet everywhere, almost everybody seems to have a water canon and trucks are driving around with huge barrels of water and people splashing it all over.

This police man has not only wrapped his radio in plastic, but also his gun.

Jannie and Chingya, entirely wet.

Chris and his wife, wet, too.

This moat surrounds the city center of Chiang Mai. The water inside is not particularly clean, but this does not prevent people from swimming in it, or from using it to make other people wet.

By now I am getting a bit concerned that my camera might get wet. We decide to have some food at the roadside and I run home to leave my bag and camera there. I realize that water is standing in my camera bag and hope the camera will survive. Then I go back to meet the others.

Obviously I cannot take any pictures anymore. We continue to walk through the crowd, now armed with water canons and buckets. I realize how much more fun it is to make other people wet, rather than being on the receiving end only.

At some point we come across on of the four gates of the old city wall. A huge procession takes place, people of all ages partly in traditional costumes pass by with nicely decorated cars with Buddhas on the back, people carry huge flags, dance, sing and shout blessing over loudspeakers. The whole event is quite fascinating, particularly given the environment in which it takes place. There are tons of people battling each other with water canons in very casual dress, next to it is a stage with loud techno music and many people dancing, and here is what appears to be a time honored tradition of celebrating the New Year. These are quite different manifestations of the same event, and they do not seem to be at odds with each other. I also note that this event is celebrated by locals and foreigners together and equally enthusiastically.

Everybody has joined the celebration.

We stop by the market where Chingya buys a selection of fried insects, like worms, and grasshoppers. I try, reluctantly at first but then find that this stuff is fairly tasty. Than we join the crowd again, at a place next to the moat, and battle each other and everybody else with water. We spent quite some time doing that and it is getting dark when we decide to go home.

I meet with Chingya in the evening. There are still pockets of people splashing water. There is a stage close to one of the gates were traditional and not so traditional performances take place. We spend some time watching.

New Year Performance.

Later we ride to the night market where we have some refreshment and talk. Many of Chingya’s family members were involved in the struggle against the Indian government and his father was killed by the Indian army. As I mentioned, I have met Chingya’s uncle in Geneva and found him to be quite an interesting person. So is Chingya. He has studied the law in India and has worked in Delhi for a lawyer organization that supported HIV/Aids affected people. Now he works as Campaign and Policy Advocacy Coordinator in AIPP. Later we walk through the market and still later hit a bar. I learn a lot about Naga in India, about AIPP and indigenous peoples in the region. It is already past midnight when we go home.

I meet Chris’ wife (unfortunately I forgot her name), who is an indigenous person from the Naga in Manipur, India. We discuss for some time. Later Jannie joins us, indigenous, too, Kadazan from Sabah in Malaysia. Jannie is Secretary General of the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), a regional network of indigenous organizations. Their office is just on the other side of the road.

Later we have lunch in a local restaurant next to the river. The food is excellent and incredibly cheap. Still later I meet with Jannie in the AIPP office. One of her staff, Chingya, joins us and we spend the afternoon with interesting discussions. Chingya is also Naga from Manipur in India. In fact I have met his uncle in Geneva, who is one of the funders of AIPP and lives currently as political refugee in Canada.

Chris’ wife has prepared a great diner and we spend the evening in their house, again with interesting discussion. Helen joins us, a young woman from Australia who works for yet another NGO, the International Alliance of Indigenous Tribal Peoples of Tropical Forests.

It is late in the evening when I try (ultimately successfully) to find my way back home with the moto scooter.

It is dark when I leave the building. It does not take long to get a taxi and I am on my way to the airport. There is massive traffic jam. At some point the car does not move for more than 15 minutes and I am getting concerned that I might miss my flight. However, there is not much traffic once we have reached the toll way. The driver speeds up and we make it in time to the airport. Bangkok’s airport for domestic flights appears smaller and more provincial than the international one. My flight is with Air Asia and I have booked it online some days ago (ca. 80Euro for the return ticket). In fact it was not easy to get a flight during these days, as foreigners as well as Thais travel to Chiang Mai to spend Songkhran here, the Thai New Year.

The flight is only about one hour and we reach Chiang Mai airport late in the evening. The climate seems a bit cooler up here. I take a taxi to the guesthouse. The taxi driver is new in the business and we are driving around for quite some time which is nice because I get to see the town. The flair is markedly different from Bangkok, more like a provincial town with low and partly old buildings, an ancient wall and a moat around it.

There appear to be countless tourists and significant nightlife. There are also countless guesthouses and my room in one of them is fairly simply, just a hard bed, a shelf, a bathroom and a van. It is late in the evening already. I go for a short walk along the road with dozens of bars and restaurants. After I have some diner I go home and sleep.

As agreed upon with the travel agency I meet the guide and the driver in the hotel lobby at 2 pm. The guide is about 30 years old and tells me that he is deputizing for his colleague who has fallen sick. I learn that he has studied design in Bangkok and works in his family’s company which produces clothes.

The guide suggests visiting Wat Benchamabophit, a temple which he considers the most beautiful in Bangkok and I agree. We reach the temple after about 30 minutes, during which he tells me all about his job but nothing about Bangkok and its sights. In addition, he suggests that I should buy a suit and some shirts in his shop which I kindly decline.

Wat Benchamabophit is made of marvel which the king brought from a visit to Italy some hundred years ago.

An initiation ceremony for young monks is going on inside and I do not enter in order not to disturb. I read in the guide book that there is a unique collection of Buddha statues in the yard. The guide is constantly talking to somebody on his cell phone while I see the statues.

Backside of Wat Benchamabophit.

The guide keeps complaining about the heat and suggests that he will wait in the shadow while I see the compound around the temple. I agree since he does not do any guiding anyway. I find the garden and other buildings quite beautiful.

This is where the monks live.

Some monks return from their initiation. It seems they have gotten some gifts.

This canal separates the Temple from the monk’s accommodations.

There are many fishes in the canal, some of them quite big.

The guide seems to have run out of ideas when I return to him. He says there is no point in visiting more temples as they all look the same (which I doubt). He ensures me that any other interesting sight would be closed today, as it is Sunday. For me it is hard to believe that there is nothing else to see on a Sunday in Bangkok. The only thing the guide can think of is a boat trip on the river which I find very appealing but at 40 US$ unacceptably overpriced. The guide appears to find it ridiculous that I do not want to afford the boat trip. Increasingly he seems to be unwilling to pursue this tour, after only about one hour. At this point I consider bringing this tour to an end, too, and exploring Bangkok on my own, since the guide is not very helpful. We agree to visit another temple where there is a 22 meter high Buddha statue before we finish.

On our way we pass this building, which houses the Thai parliament, according to the guide.

This is the statue.

This is inside the temple. There are many beauty- and colorful paintings on the walls.

The guide tries to hook me up with a prostitute on the way back to the hotel.

After I have some rest in the hotel I leave again. I walk down Phetchaburi Road towards Chalermlok Market in the east where I turn to the south and head to the Central World Plaza and the Siam Center. There is massive traffic on the road and the narrow pavements are crowded with people, a good share of them obviously foreigners.

Phetchaburi Road.

In front of the Central World Plaza

There is some sort of promotion event in front of one of the huge office buildings. A Thai rock band is playing but it sounds fairly Western to me.

Ratchadamri is a multiple road construction that carries a ‘sky route’ and what appears to be a highway, all above the main road.

I enter the Siam Center. This is a very modern building that houses countless rather expensive shops and a huge cinema on the upper floors. I walk around for some time and have some food.

Inside the Siam Center.

At some point a young man ask me whether I need a moto taxi. I knew that there are taxis and tuk tuks but did not know there are moto taxis. Given the traffic jam on the road I ask the guy to give me a ride to the area around Khao San Road. Khao San is located in the west, near the river and it takes some time to get there. Most of the backpackers stay here and it is supposed to be a vibrant and fascinating place. Thanks to the motorbike we snake through the dense traffic fairly quick.

Songkhran, the Thai New Year, is coming up next week. What is popular during these days is to splash water at each other. This holiday is particularly excessively celebrated in Chiang Mai. As it happens, I will travel to Chiang Mai tomorrow afternoon.

All along the way are many people and there are many lavishly decorated trucks along the road that leads to the Democracy Monument.

Democracy Monument. Tons of people all over the place.

Shortly after we arrive at Khao San Road. The road is extremely crowded with foreigners and at least as many Thais. There are all kinds of shops, restaurants, guesthouses, tattoo shops, barbers and so on which seem to cater mainly to tourists and at very reasonable prices.

I walk around for quite some time and get myself a hair cut and a cocktail. Later I check my email, before I head back to the hotel with a tuk tuk.

My journey to Cambodia starts on April 10. I fly from Berlin to Frankfurt and from there to Bangkok. Not much happens during this trip that would be worth reporting. I tend to find long distance flights rather annoying and this one is no difference. In Frankfurt I find that my luggage is checked in all the way to Phnom Penh, while I want to stay in Thailand for one week where I will need my stuff. I talk to the people from the airline and they ensure me that they will make sure that I get my bags in Bangkok. I try to get a seat at the window but no such seat is available any more and I find myself between two mid aged men who appear to be sex tourists and spend most of the time sleeping and snoring.

We reach Bangkok very early in the morning of April 11 and like all the other travelers I wait for my bags at the luggage claim. Unlike them I wait in vain. So I talk to a number of airport staff. These people are very helpful and after about half an hour I get my bags. A person from a tourist agency approaches me on my way out. What he offers is a taxi to my hotel now together with a sightseeing tour in the afternoon with a private car and tour guide for about 30 Euro. The taxi to the hotel would cost me about 8 Euro anyway. Moreover, it is weekend and a guide seems to be a nice thing to have for just one day in a city like Bangkok. So he and his numerous colleagues manage to persuade me, not least by showing me certificates that appear to show that the services of this company are audited and recognized by the Thai government.

The ride to the hotel takes about half an hour, during which I get to see very urban environment with many skyscrapers, multistory highways and significant traffic jam.

Road just outside the airport.

Huge skyscraper.

Road just outside the hotel.

The name of the hotel is Central Point and it appears to be fairly luxurious compared to what I would have chosen for myself. This accommodation was chosen and booked by my organization at UN rates and I have to pay only modest 25 US$ per night. My room in the 8th floor is generously sized and air conditioned. There is a huge bed, a small kitchen, a sofa and some chairs, TV and stereo, a balcony and a safe. I have a few hours of rest before I prepare for the sightseeing tour in the afternoon.

My room.

Views from the balcony.

The appeal of living in Geneva and working almost exclusively in front of a computer is completely exhausted for me and I am very happy to have the privilege of getting to work in the field again. And not just anywhere, but in Cambodia, the country which I fall in love with while working for the GTZ more than one year ago. I am also very satisfied with my assignment, which, while challenging, involves a wide range of activities that I like much better than anything I can do on a desk. Before I travel to Cambodia I have a few days off, which I use to visit my home in Potsdam, spending time with family and friends and for a short trip to the Baltic Sea.

On my way to Cambodia I will spend a week in Thailand for consultations with ILO staff in the sub-regional ILO office in Bangkok and with a number of international and regional NGOs working on the promotion of indigenous rights in Chiang Mai.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

Please find a short summary below.

In this text, I compare and contrast the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia with theories of multicultural citizenship and minority rights that are emerging in contemporary political philosophy.

The first part of this thesis discusses political theories of multiculturalism, which will then be applied to cultural diversity in Cambodia. A brief discussion of the course of the minority rights debate in three stages serves as a point of departure. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s distinctively liberal theory of minority rights will be introduced. Following a discussion of the importance of cultural membership for the individual, various arguments justifying certain group-rights will be introduced and assessed.

The argument will then turn to recent developments in political theory associated with the emerging position of liberal nationalism. The first part will be summarized in its final section with emphasis on the implications for indigenous peoples. Along the way, criticism leveled against Kymlicka’s theory will be put forward and discussed. The second part is primarily concerned with indigenous peoples in Cambodia. It will begin with a general overview of Cambodia’s cultural minorities. Afterwards, the incorporation of various groups into the Cambodian nation -state and their integration into Cambodia’s mainstream society will be discussed in light of the concepts introduced in the first part. The argument will identify Cambodia’s hill tribes as indigenous peoples and highlight the involuntary nature of their incorporation, while stressing the importance of these groups’ survival for the well-being of their individual members. The discussion will assess current policies towards indigenous peoples in Cambodia with particular emphasis on the Royal Government’s current decentralization program. This part will include the results of empirical research carried out in three northeastern provinces, the objective of which was to assess the situation of indigenous peoples within the current decentralization process and to explore ways of better accommodating the rights of these peoples within the emerging framework of local governance.

Based on the research results as well as the earlier discussion, this paper will explore ways to better accommodate the needs and fair demands of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. Along the way, the validity and limitations of Kymlicka’s concepts in the Cambodian context will be assessed. The hypothesis is that Kymlicka’s theory provides a valid framework to analyze cultural diversity in Cambodia and to understand the challenges involved in accommodating various indigenous peoples. Accordingly, this paper supports the view that meaningful measures of self-government rights, language rights, land rights, and special representation rights for these groups are needed to allow them to sustain their existence as distinct societies. However, institutionalizing these rights is likely to take a shape significantly different from the ‘multination federation’ model preferred by Kymlicka. Given the situation of indigenous peoples in Cambodia and the nature of the Cambodian state, the local level of government is likely to provide the framework for these groups’ accommodation.

The text concludes that a decentralized framework offers many opportunities for improved protection of indigenous rights, as well as for more inclusive democracy and highland peoples’ active participation. To realize those opportunities, differentiated measures to promote indigenous peoples are called for. Those measures should not be seen as ‘privileges’ or ‘special advantages’, but as balancing disadvantages exclusively faced by members of indigenous groups. A multination conception of decentralization helps to compensate for those disadvantages and to ensure that the value of cultural membership is equally protected for all citizens of Cambodia.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

The aim of the thesis is to discuss and assess the rights of cultural minorities in Cambodia in the light of Western liberal theories of multiculturalism. More precisely, the thesis compares and contrasts Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship with the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. By doing so, I hope to justify and make plausible specific rights for indigenous peoples, in particular some measure of self-government rights and special representation rights.

Today I finished the first draft of the text. There are still some formal problems and minor inconsistencies in the argumentation. However, I think feedback would be most valuable at this point of the process, where I have still time to accommodate comments and considerations regarding the overall argumentation and structure of the text. Therefore, I make the text available here, as word document (788kb) and .pdf file (631kb). Any feedback will be greatly appreciated.

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(Word)

“The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia”(PDF)

THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CAMBODIA

Introduction 2
I. THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM 5
1. Three Stages of the Debate over Minority Rights 5
1. Minority Rights as Communitarianism 5
2. Minority Rights within a Liberal Framework 6
3. Minority Rights as Response to State Nation-Building 7
2. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 10
1. Two Patterns of Cultural Diversity 10
2. Indigenous Peoples 12
3. Group-Differentiated Rights 16
4. Societal Cultures 19
5. Justifying Group-Differentiated Rights 21
6. Judging Group-Differentiated Rights 24
7. Liberal Nationalism 28
8. Liberal Democracy and Nationhood 29
9. Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying 31
10. Indigenous Rights and Decentralization 32
1. CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CAMBODIA 33
1. The Cultural Composition of Cambodia’s Population 35
2. Ethnic Groups: Immigration 36
3. Ethnic Groups: Integration 39
4. Conclusions: Ethnic Groups 42
1. National Minorities: Hill Tribes 44
1. Becoming Minorities: Involuntary Incorporation 44
2. Nation-Destroying: Integrating Hill Tribes into the Khmer Nation 45
3. Nation Building and its Liberal Limits in Cambodia 46
4. Current Policy towards Hill Tribes: Nation-Destroying 50
5. Current Policies towards Hill Tribes: Accommodation 54
6. Decentralization and Nation-Building 57
2. Empirical Research: Indigenous Peoples and Decentralization 60
1. Research Design and Methodology 60
2. Hill Tribes: Meaningful Choices through Societal Cultures 61
3. The Value of Cultural Membership 63
4. Traditional and Formal Institutions 65
5. Access 66
6. Language 69
7. Participation 70
8. Attitudes among Government Officials: Integration 71
9. Representation 73
10. Decentralization and Indigenous Rights 75
11. Justifying Indigenous Rights 77
3. CONCLUSIONS 81
4. LITERATURE 88

The Theory of Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity in Cambodia
Introduction
The aim of this diploma thesis is to discuss and assess the rights of cultural minorities in Cambodia in the light of Western liberal theories of multiculturalism. More precisely, this thesis compares and contrasts Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship with the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples in Cambodia. There are a number of reasons to pay attention to the rights of indigenous peoples and to do so in Cambodia specifically. Indigenous peoples are considered among the world’s most disadvantaged groups and belong to the most vulnerable and impoverished segments of the population in virtually any of the countries in which they are found. This is due to a variety of reasons, among them their exclusion from the decision-making process, small numbers of members, great cultural distance to the majority group, geographical isolation, fragile ecology, and because their ways of live tend to be greatly at odds with modernity . Cambodia is no exception in this respect.
Another reason to discuss indigenous peoples in Cambodia is closely related to a dramatic reversal that has been taking place in many countries in the way indigenous peoples are being treated, particularly in the West and in Latin America. Previously, the expectation was that indigenous peoples would cease to exist due to dying out, inter-marriage, or assimilation. Frequently, governments adopted policies to accelerate this process. This approach has changed radically. Today, all Western and most Latin American countries accept the idea that indigenous peoples will exist into the indefinite future as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and that they should have the land claims, cultural rights, and self-government rights needed to perpetuate themselves as distinct societies. A remarkable process of decolonization is taking place throughout these countries, as indigenous peoples regain their lands, self-government, and customary law .
This process corresponds to recent developments in international law, which today reflects the most advanced practice of Western countries regarding indigenous rights. Land claims, customary law, and self-government for indigenous peoples are all firmly recognized in recent international documents, such as the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 169 and the United Nations’ draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Anaya 1996). Besides these declarations of indigenous rights, international financial organizations – such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – have adopted policies designed to recognize and respect the distinct rights of indigenous peoples.
The development in Western and Latin American countries provides a strong contrast to Asia. While some states in Asia are moving towards the greater recognition of the distinct needs and rights of indigenous peoples, no such development has been taking place in most Asian countries and the situation of indigenous peoples has not been subject to much debate . An indication of this contrast is that no Asian country has ratified ILO Convention No. 169 yet. In this regard, too, Cambodia is no exception. Moreover, indigenous groups in Cambodia received even lesser attention compared to neighboring countries, because Cambodia is regarded the culturally most homogenous country in the region, because indigenous peoples make up only a very small proportion of the overall population, and because these groups are characterized by a remarkably low level of organization and mobilization. Given this contrast, it is interesting to analyze and discuss the situation of indigenous peoples in Asia in general and in Cambodia in particular.
There are a number of reasons to use Kymlicka’s theoretical framework for this discussion. Kymlicka was among the first theorists to systematically theorize the rights of cultural minorities and his theory is widely regarded the most influential in its field. This is reflected not least in the fact that the most prominent critics of multiculturalism use his concepts to formulate their objections. Another reason to apply this theory to Cambodia is to test the author’s assumption that important elements of his theory can be applied in many Asian countries (Kymlicka 2003). Furthermore, Kymlicka’s theory presents a distinctively liberal conception of minority rights. Although Cambodia is not a liberal state, many people in Cambodia aspire to liberal institutions and practice. This is reflected in the frequent use of the term in public discourse as well as in Cambodia’s constitution . Given this aspiration, discussing the challenges of cultural pluralism in the light of liberal principles seems a particularly worthwhile exercise in Cambodia and Kymlicka’s theory offers a suitable framework to do so. Other reasons to use Kymlicka’s theory are more practical. This theory is capable of explaining and justifying the dramatic changes regarding the recognition of indigenous rights in Western and Latin American countries mentioned above. Applying it to Cambodia can help to capitalize on the experience of these countries in accommodating their indigenous populations. Furthermore, as the discussion will show, Kymlicka’s theory is consistent with various declarations of indigenous rights in international law mentioned above and capable of justifying their objectives. Increasingly, Cambodia is being expected to comply with these international norms of indigenous rights, not least due to a growing rights-consciousness among members of the affected groups and increasing linkages between local organizations and international networks advocating for indigenous rights. This trend is being reinforced by the considerable involvement of international organizations in Cambodia. For example, the World Bank and ADB have already determined that their policies apply to indigenous peoples in Cambodia . There is widespread agreement that an appropriate policy for Cambodia’s indigenous peoples is needed. However, there is little consensus about how such a policy might look like. Given the increasing importance of international norms of indigenous rights in Cambodia, applying Kymlicka’s theory and discussing its limitations can contribute to a well-informed debate about whether or not the associated models can and should be applied in Cambodia. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to this debate and ultimately to the development of a viable and justifiable policy for Cambodia’s indigenous peoples.
The first part of this thesis discusses the political theory of multicultural citizenship which will then be applied to the Cambodian context in the second part. A brief discussion of the course of the minority rights debate in three stages serves as a point of departure. Afterwards, central elements of Will Kymlicka’s distinctively liberal theory of minority rights will be introduced. This discussion is not limited to indigenous peoples. Rather, Kymlicka’s typology of cultural minorities will facilitate contrasting the situation and aspirations of indigenous peoples with other cultural minorities. Following a discussion of the importance of cultural membership for the individual, various arguments justifying certain group-rights will be introduced and assessed. The argumentation will then turn to recent developments in political theory associated with the emerging position of liberal nationalism. In its final section, the first part will be summarized with emphasis on the implication for indigenous peoples. Along the way, criticism leveled against Kymlicka’s theory will be introduced and discussed. The second part is concerned with cultural minorities in Cambodia. Following a general overview of Cambodia’s cultural diversity, the incorporation of various groups into the Cambodian nation-state and their integration into Cambodia’s mainstream society will be discussed in the light of the concepts introduced in the first part. The argumentation will identify Cambodia’s hill tribes as indigenous peoples and highlight the involuntary nature of their incorporation while stressing the importance of these groups’ survival for the well-being of their individual members. The discussion will assess current policies towards indigenous peoples with particular emphasis on the Royal Governments’ current decentralization program. This part will include the results of empirical research carried out in three northeastern provinces.
Based on the research results as well as the earlier discussion the thesis will explore ways to better accommodate the needs and fair demands of indigenous peoples and assess the validity and limitations of Kymlicka’s theory in the Cambodian context. The hypothesis is that Kymlicka’s theory provides a largely valid framework to analyze and understand cultural diversity in Cambodia and the challenges involved in accommodating various indigenous peoples. Accordingly, meaningful measures of self-government rights, language rights, land rights, and special representation rights for these groups are needed to enable them to sustain their existence as distinct societies. However, institutionalizing these rights is likely to take forms significantly different from the ‘multination federation’ model preferred by Kymlicka. Given the situation of indigenous peoples in Cambodia and the nature of the Cambodian state, the local level of government is likely to provide the framework for their accommodation. More research is needed with the active involvement of groups members is needed to develop local models that effectively correspond to the specific situation, needs and interests of Cambodia’s indigenous peoples.
I. THE THEORY OF MULTICULTURALISM
1. Three Stages of the Debate over Minority Rights
1. Minority Rights as Communitarianism
The debate over the rights of minorities during the 70s and 80s was essentially framed in terms of the familiar controversy between liberalism and communitarianism . While promoters of liberalism insist on the priority of individual freedom, communitarians stress that individuals are members of and constituted through groups or communities and embedded in a particular social infrastructure (Rawls 1971; Sandel 1982; Taylor 1992). From the communitarian perspective, individuals are products of social practices and do not revise their conception of the good life. Liberals stress the priority of the rights of free and equal citizens, while communitarians stress the priority of shared values and various forms of communities. Since questions of minority or group-specific rights involve ethnocultural communities mobilizing for the protection of their group, it was believed that one’s position in the minority rights debate derived from one’s position in the communitarianism debate. At this stage, the assumption was that promoters of liberalism would oppose minority rights as subordinating individual autonomy, while communitarians would support minority rights as protecting communities from the corroding influence of liberal individualism. Ethnocultural minorities where thought to maintain a more collective way of life and did not yet give in to liberal autonomy. From the communitarian perspective, minority rights provide those groups with appropriate protection against individualism and help to promote the value and significance of the community. At this stage of the debate, promoting minority rights was bound to endorsing the communitarian critique of liberal individualism, and to understanding minority rights as defense of community-oriented minority groups against liberalism. Promoters of minority rights agreed with communitarians that minority rights contradict liberal individualism and admitted that this simply shows the inherent failure of liberalism. Maybe the most elaborate communitarian supporter of minority rights at this stage of the debate is Vernon Van Dyke. In his book Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (1985) he provides an extensive account of the practice of collective rights in numerous countries. Following this rich variety of examples he criticizes the “arbitrary and unjustified” individualism of liberal-democratic theory. Van Dyke concludes that traditional liberalism “needs to be modified so as to recognize the just claims of certain kinds of groups – that is, so as to concede them rights that are distinct from and not reducible to individual rights” (Van Dyke 1985: 195). Like many communitarians, Van Dyke remains ambiguous towards liberalism and leaves open whether he criticizes liberalism from within or outside this tradition. However, his position is characteristic of the first stage of the minority rights debate, because it endorses the communitarian critique of liberalism and views minority rights as defending cohesive and communally-minded minority groups against the invasion of liberal individualism.
2. Minority Rights within a Liberal Framework
These assumptions were increasingly questioned. It became more and more clear that most ethnocultural groups in Western states are not seeking protection from modernity, but ask for equal participation in modern liberal societies. Even if some members of national minorities contemplate secession, they mostly do not want to create illiberal communitarian societies. In modern democracies, the obligation to individual autonomy crosses ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages. The debate about minority rights thus turns into a debate between groups and individuals who disagree about the interpretation, not about the validity of liberal principles. Promoters of multiculturalism suggest that some group specific rights are in line with – and might indeed be required by – liberal-democratic principles. The question at this stage of the debate is not how to protect illiberal minorities from liberalism, but whether minorities which support liberal principles none the less need minority rights.
Various authors have strengthened this position of liberal culturalism, which insists on the critical significance of cultural identity and national membership for the autonomy of individuals. They point out that pressing interests associated with culture and identities are consistent with liberal freedom and equality.
Margalit and Raz, for example, stress the importance of groups to the well-being of their members and point out that the moral importance of the group’s interest depends on its value to individuals. For them, individual well-being depends on the successful pursuit of goals and relationships. These goals and relationships are products of culture and depend for their existence on shared patterns of expectations, traditions, and conventions. In this perspective, understanding of one’s own culture is what determines the boundaries of the imaginable for the individual. Cultural membership profoundly affects a person’s opportunities and ability to engage in meaningful relationships. Moreover, a person’s sense of identity is bound up with her cultural membership, and her individual self-respect depends in part on the esteem in which her group is being held. Cultures are particularly well-suited for individual self-identification, because they provide the safety of effortless secure belonging. Accordingly, “individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of which contributes to one’s sense of identity, be generally respected and not be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution” (Margalit/Raz 1995: pp. 85). In Kymlicka’s theory, the position of liberal culturalism – and the link between a group and the well being of its individual members – is closely related to the concept of societal culture, which will be discussed in some length in section 4. In short, Kymlicka argues that people make choices about various conception of the good life based on beliefs about the value of those conceptions. Those beliefs require understanding the meanings attached to them by culture, history, and language. Consequently, only access to a societal culture provides individuals with meaningful choices, that is, culture is the precondition of individual autonomy.
This second stage takes the debate beyond the frontline of individualism versus collectivism that has characterized the discussion at its first stage. The question of minority rights is widely debated within liberal theory. Promoters of liberal culturalism support the view that some minority rights advance liberal values. Because special status for minorities presents a stark contrast to the ‘neutral’ operations of the liberal state, the burden of proof lies on its defenders. Liberal culturalists aim to meet this burden of proof by showing the significance of cultural membership in protecting individual freedom and self-respect. They seek to support the view that minority rights supplement individual freedom and equality. The scope of group-specific rights within liberal theory remains deeply controversial . The challenge facing liberal culturalists is to differentiate between minority rights that restrict individual rights from minority rights that supplement them. Kymlicka aims to tackle this problem by distinguishing ‘internal restrictions’ from ‘external protections’. Internal restrictions are minority rights which restrict the freedom of group members. In contrast, external protections are designed to reduce the group’s vulnerability to external pressures. This distinction will be discussed in section 5.
3. Minority Rights as Response to State Nation-Building
The second stage of the debate is increasingly challenged as well, because it is said to misinterpret the role of ethnic identities and language in the liberal state and because it misconceives the requirements the state places on minorities. The underlying assumption of the second stage has been the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state. What marks the third stage of the debate, then, is that this assumption becomes increasingly contested. Typically, liberals have strongly endorsed a strict separation of church and state. As this ideal of ‘benign neglect’ has contributed well to accommodate religious diversity, many liberals have assumed that the model of the neutral state can be applied to cultural diversity as well. Both spheres, culture and religion, are thought to be privatized, that is, not the concern of the liberal state. There are no official cultures with public privileges and the state is understood to be indifferent towards the reproduction of ethnocultural groups. As with religion, citizens are free to pursue and promote matters of culture in their private lives, while the standard operations of the liberal state do not privilege one religion or culture over the other. For many liberals, the United States provide the clearest manifestation of these principles, since it does not have a constitutionally recognized official language. To become American, then, means to agree to certain principles of democracy and individual freedom, while it does not necessitate allegiance to a particular culture. Other theorists claim that the separation of state and culture marks the difference between liberal ‘civic nations’ and illiberal ‘ethnic nations’. While ethnic nations take an active interest in the reproduction of a particular culture and identity, civic nations define national membership entirely in terms of respect for principles of democracy and justice. In the West, claims of minorities for accommodation beyond the common citizenship rights have traditionally been rejected with reference to the principle of ethnocultural neutrality. Because minority rights represent a radical departure from the ideal of a ‘civic nation’ or state neutrality, the burden of proof at the second stage of the debate lies with defenders of group-differentiated rights. As was discussed in the previous section, Kymlicka aims to meet this burden of proof by showing that cultural membership is the precondition of individual freedom and autonomy.
The view that the liberal state is indifferent towards the cultural identity of its citizens is increasingly being rejected. Taylor, for example, objects to the view that “difference-blind” liberalism operates culturally neutral: “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges. As an “organic outgrowth of Christianity” Taylor notes, “liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed” (Taylor 1994: 62). Kymlicka, too, rejects the ideal of the ethnocultural neutral state. He points out that the religion model cannot be applied to the relationship between the state and ethnocultural groups. While it is possible for the state not to have an official religion, the state cannot help but operate its institutions in particular languages, thereby privileging speakers of this language and putting speakers of other languages at a distinct disadvantage. This does not happen by accident. In the case of the United States, for example, decisions about the boundaries of state governments were intentionally made in a way that ensured the dominance of the English language throughout the territory. Ongoing policies reinforce this dominance in several ways. Children are legally required to learn English in schools. To acquire American citizenship, immigrants are legally required to learn English. In practice, command of the English language is required for employment with the government or to secure government contracts. Kymlicka suggests that these decisions are not accidental exceptions to the principle of cultural neutrality, but tightly interrelated. Together, those decisions “have shaped the very structure of the American state, and the way the state structures society (Kymlicka 2001a: 25). The existence of nation-states is no coincidence, but the result of deliberate nation-building policies, adopted by governments to diffuse and promote a common language, culture, and sense of national membership. Among the tools of nation-building are citizenship policy, language laws, education curriculums, public service employment, support for national media, the drawing of internal boundaries, and national symbols. The underlying intention of nation-building policies is the promotion of integration into a single societal culture. As a result of guaranteed rights and freedoms, societal cultures in liberal democracies are inevitably pluralistic. However, linguistic and institutional cohesion intentionally constrains this diversity: Governments have deliberately encouraged citizens to view their life-chances as tied up with participation in common societal institutions that operate in one national language. By doing so, governments have supported a national identity defined in part by common membership in a societal culture. The United States are not an exception in this respect. Rather, promoting integration into the mainstream culture is a function of a ‘nation-building’ project that has been undertaken in all liberal democracies. All liberal-democratic states have historically been nation-building states : “they have encouraged and sometimes forced all the citizens on the territory of the state to integrate into common public institutions operating in a common language” (Kymlicka 2001a: 23). The process of nation-building inevitably privileges members of the majority culture and puts speakers of other languages at a disadvantage. Therefore, the model of the culturally neutral state must be replaced with a model of states engages in nation building, which offers a very different perspective on the debate about minority rights. Claims for minority rights must be understood in the context of, and as a defensive response to, state nation-building. This relationship is what Kymlicka calls the dialectic of state nation-building and minority rights. Thus, Kymlicka arrives at the third stage of the debate. At this stage, the question is not anymore how to justify deviation from the ideal of cultural neutrality. Rather, the question is whether minority rights help to protect against unjust disadvantages. The burden of proof at this stage is at least partly on those who object to minority rights.

Illustration 1: ct. Kymlicka 2002: 362
In this perspective it is not cultural neutrality what distinguishes liberal states from illiberal states. Indeed, Kymlicka suggests that nation-building has a legitimate role to play in liberal democratic societies. The benefits associated with nation-building will be introduced in section 7. What characterizes liberal states is not their cultural neutrality, but that majority nation-building is subject to certain limitations. So far, there is no systematic theoretical account on the liberal limits of nation-building. In a recent book, Kymlicka suggests the following three conditions:
1. No groups of long-term residents are permanently excluded from membership in the nation. Everyone living on the territory must be able to gain citizenship and become an equal member of the nation if he so wishes.
2. The integration required of immigrant groups is understood in a ‘thin’ sense, and involves primarily institutional and linguistic integration, not the adoption of particular sets of customs, religious beliefs, or lifestyles.
3. National minorities are allowed to engage in their own nation-building, to enable them to maintain themselves as distinct societal cultures (Kymlicka 2001: 48).
The third stage of the minority rights debate is closely associated with Kymlicka’s theory. The dialectic of nation-building and minority rights represents an important innovation in Kymlicka’s theory and the associated arguments in his theory will be discussed in more detail after his initial theory is outlined.
2. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
1. Two Patterns of Cultural Diversity
Any theory of group-differentiated rights must distinguish between various groups in order to assign certain specific rights to them. The major concern of this thesis is with the rights of indigenous peoples. However, outlining Kymlicka’s complete typology of cultural minorities will allow contrasting the nature and demands of various groups and make more plausible the specific rights this theory assigns to indigenous peoples.
The central distinction in Kymlicka’s theory differentiates between two patterns of cultural diversity: national minorities and ethnic groups (immigrant groups). According to this distinction, it is the mode of their incorporation into the political community what shapes the nature of a minority group, the identities of its members, and the form of relationship they desire with the larger society. While the existence of ethnic groups comes about by their voluntary migration, national minorities were involuntarily incorporated into larger states . The distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups has a descriptive and a normative dimension, which are not well separated in Kymlicka’s writing. On the descriptive level, the distinction asserts that in the real world various national minorities have relevant characteristics in common which they do not share with various ethnic groups and vice versa. On the normative level, the distinction suggests that it is justified to assign different rights to national minorities and to ethnic groups. Although Kymlicka does not explicitly make this point, it is consistent with the liberal point of view he is supporting: Because the basis of political legitimacy is the consent of the governed, it seems plausible to assign stronger cultural rights to groups whose members did not choose to join the political community (that is, persons who cannot said to have sign the social contract, to refer to the theoretical model central to liberal theory).
The distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups corresponds to and is closely associated with other important concepts and distinctions in Kymlicka’s theory. The table below presents these central terms and their relationships. Following a brief discussion of both types of groups, the argumentation will address each of the terms in the list and show how they relate to the initial distinction. The second part of this thesis will discuss cultural diversity in Cambodia in the light of these concepts. Part of this discussion is to assess whether or not those terms and concepts useful to describe and analyze Cambodia’s cultural minorities.
Ethnic Groups National Minorities
Multicultural States Polyethnic States Multination States
Source of Cultural Pluralism Immigration Colonization, Conquer, Annexation, Ceding
Mode of Incorporation Voluntary Involuntary
Model in Western Democracies Immigrant Multiculturalism Multination Federalism
Group-Differentiated Rights Polyethnic rights Self-government rights, special representation rights
Rationale, Purpose Integration Accommodation, Separation, Autonomy
Societal Culture No Yes
Emerging Consensus: Liberal Culturalism Liberal multiculturalism Liberal nationalism
Question What are fair terms of integration? What are permissible forms of nation-building?
In the case of national minorities, cultural diversity arises from the coexistence of two or more nations within a given state. The term ‘nation’ here is used synonymously with ‘people’ or ‘culture’ and defined as “a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture” (Kymlicka 1995a: 11). Consequently, a given country which contains more than one nation is a multination state and the smaller peoples form national minorities. National minorities form previously self-governing and territorially concentrated cultures. In most cases, the incorporation of national minorities into a state occurs involuntarily and often forcefully. In few cases, multination states come about by the voluntarily agreement between different cultures to form a federation. Many countries are multinational, since boundaries throughout the world were drawn to incorporate the territory of pre-existing, and previously self-governing, societies. Typically, national minorities want to maintain their existence as distinct societies alongside the national majority. In many instances, national minorities struggle to sustain or regain their institutions of self-government and their distinct language. Frequently, they demand some form of autonomy or various self-government rights to make certain the perpetuation of their culture (ct. Kymlicka 1995a: 10).
The second pattern of cultural diversity arises from the voluntary immigration of families and individuals. ‘Ethnic groups’ (or immigrant groups) are not ‘nations’ and do not occupy territories. The existence of ethnic groups in states comes about by individual or familial decisions to abandon the original culture and migrate to another society, leaving behind friends and families. Over generations, ethnic communities with some measure of internal cohesion and organization emerge. States which accepted significant numbers of individuals and families from other cultures as immigrants and allow them to maintain some of their ethnic particularity are polyethnic states. The distinctiveness of ethnic groups is expressed for the most part in family lives and voluntary associations. This is not inconsistent with their linguistic integration and participation in the public institutions of the majority culture. While immigrant groups have struggled for the right to express their ethnic particularity, they typically wish to assert this right in common public institutions: “While ethnic groups frequently demand greater recognition of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and self-governing nation alongside the larger society, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences” (Kymlicka 1995a: 11). Unlike national minorities, the recreation of the original culture is neither desirable nor feasible for immigrant groups. Rather, ethnic groups have typically accepted the expectation of their integration into the larger culture and the assumption that their children’s life-chances will be bound up with the language and institutions of the host society. Instead of resisting majority nation-building towards their integration into the larger society, immigrants frequently wish to renegotiate the terms of integration, to allow for the maintenance of various aspects of their particular ethnic heritage .
2. Indigenous Peoples
Generally, there is no universally agreed definition of indigenous peoples. While Kymlicka treats indigenous peoples as subcategory of national minorities, other theorists argue that indigenous peoples should be seen as entirely distinct category with specific rights. There are various justifications for singling out indigenous peoples for stronger rights, such as the scale of their historical mistreatment or their ‘radical’ cultural difference. In various writings, Kymlicka has altered and complemented his typology and has defined various sub-categories. However, the distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups remains a central feature of his theory. In recent works, Kymlicka suggests to subdivide national minorities into substate nation’ (or stateless nations) and indigenous peoples. In this view, the major difference is the groups’ role in the process of state-formation: “stateless nations were contenders but losers in the process of European state-formation, whereas indigenous peoples were entirely isolated from that process until very recently, and so retained a pre-modern way of life until well into this century” (Kymlicka 2001a: 122). While indigenous peoples existed outside the system of modern nation-states, substate nations aspired to such a state but lost in the contest and consequently do not have a state in which they form a majority. Substate nations find themselves sharing a state with other nations for reasons such as conquer, annexation, ceding, or royal marriage. Indigenous peoples are peoples whose homelands have been overrun by settlers, and who have been involuntarily incorporated into states run by people they regard as foreigners. In contrast to substate nations, indigenous peoples typically do not seek a nation-state with competing economic and social institutions. Rather, indigenous peoples tend to demand the ability to maintain certain traditional ways of life yet participating in the modern world on their own terms. As a starting point, indigenous peoples demand respect for and recognition of their culture to overcome their status as second-class citizen, non-citizen, or slaves. Kymlicka continues to stress that important characteristics are shared by substate nations and indigenous peoples. In particular, all these groups typically formed complete societies in their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a larger state, and all those groups tend to resist state nation-building policies. The following picture provides an overview of one variation of Kymlicka’s typology.

Illustration 2 ct. Kymlicka 1995
In her recent book The Claims of Culture, Seyla Benhabib defends what she calls a dual-track conception of deliberative democracy. She devotes many pages to criticisms of various aspects of Kymlicka’s theory. In particular the distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups is subject to her objections. Firstly, she insists that a sharp distinction between those classes of groups is hard to sustain on the descriptive level. Whether or not this is a valid criticism is an empirical question and impossible to answer in the framework of this thesis. However, it should be pointed out that this distinction provides a meaningful description of cultural diversity in Cambodia, as the second part of this thesis will show. Secondly, Benhabib criticizes that the distinction insists upon the historical genealogy of the integration of groups which she claims is tantamount to cultural essentialism (Benhabib 2002: pp. 62). However, Kymlicka agrees that – in principle – ethnic groups can become national minorities and vice versa. Moreover, he admits that people do move between cultures do to integrate into other societies. What he insists upon is the value of cultural membership and what he questions is whether people who did not chose to immigrate should be required to integrate into the majorities language and institutions. Insofar, he cannot be blamed for cultural essentialism. Interestingly, Benhabib does not address the situation of indigenous peoples throughout her book. Only in the very end, Benhabib mentions that “… there are peoples whose cultural identity is rooted in ways of life attached to a particular region, territory, or hunting and fishing domain. These peoples are seeking not to preserve their languages, customs, and culture alone but to retain the integrity of ways of life greatly at odds with modernity … I think that from the standpoint of deliberative democracy, we need to create institutions through which members of these communities can negotiate and debate the future of their own conditions of existence. I follow Kymlicka … in advocating certain land, language, and representation rights for indigenous populations” (Benhabib 2002: pp. 184). It remains unclear what reason justifies this surprising move. Why should we create institutions through which members of indigenous peoples can negotiate their future but deny such institutions to members of stateless nations? Is it because indigenous peoples’ ways of life are ‘attached to the land’ or because those ways of life are ‘greatly at odds with modernity’? There does not seem to be any reason inherent to Benhabib’s theory of deliberative democracy which would support granting specific rights to indigenous peoples. Moreover, it seems that she falls herself into the trap of cultural essentialism, by indicating that attachment to land and premodern ways of lives are essential features of indigenous societies. In this view, members of indigenous peoples stop being indigenous as soon as they modernize their ways of live, lets say: drive cars, use self phones, or live in cities. This does not seem to respond to the aspirations of indigenous peoples who in most instances desire to incorporate elements of modernity into their cultures and yet demand recognition and protection of their existence as separate societies. Taken together, Benhabib’s theory of deliberative democracy does not allow understanding and explaining the different aspirations of various groups. Throughout her book, the specific political implications of her model remain unclear. In contrast to Benhabib’s concept, Kymlicka’s theory is particularly well suited to discuss and analyze cultural diversity, because it is comprehensive and capable of integrating and justifying the right of different classes of groups within a single and consistent theoretical framework. This case will be strengthened during the following chapters.
In line with both Benhabib’s and Kymlicka’s theory, current and emerging international law grants considerable levels of political autonomy to indigenous peoples. Yet in line with Benhabib’s theory and in contrast to Kymlicka’s, there is a strong tendency in international law to strictly separate questions of indigenous rights from the rights of stateless nations and other cultural minorities. Generally, the relevant declarations grant considerably more cultural rights – such as land claims and customary law – to indigenous peoples than to any other class of group. Under present international law, the specific rights of indigenous peoples are found only under ILO Convention No. 169. This convention does not define indigenous peoples. Rather, it contains a statement of coverage and a subjective criterion, stressing the self-identification of groups as indigenous peoples. However, the statement of coverage underlines that indigenous peoples live in historical continuity in a certain area since before the establishment of modern states, maintain a way of live different from other segments of the society, and retain their own institutions and organizations . Insofar, the ILO’s definition of indigenous peoples and Kymlicka’s distinctions are very likely to identify the same groups as indigenous peoples. The specific rights of indigenous peoples contained in Convention No. 169 are considerably different from human rights and other minority rights in that they are intended to allow for a high degree of autonomous development and allocates authority to those peoples so that they can make their own decisions (Eide/ Daes 2000: 8). Although referring to peoples, Convention No. 169 does not deal with the question whether indigenous groups have the right to self-determination. More far-reaching rights are proposed in the UN’s draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. If ratified by the General Assembly, this declaration will determine in its article 3 that indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination and by virtue of that right be entitled freely to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. In its political implications, Kymlicka’s theory is highly consistent with both Convention 169 as well as the draft UN’s draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As both organizations have considerable operations in Cambodia, it is worth mentioning that the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have adopted policies designed specifically to provide guidance to staff to deal with indigenous peoples . And the definitions in both policies are likely to identify the same groups as indigenous peoples as does Kymlicka’s typology. The objective of the World Bank’s policy is to ensure “full respect for [indigenous peoples’] dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness (World Bank 1991: Article 6). It would not make much sense to respect indigenous peoples’ ‘cultural uniqueness’ and yet promote their integration. Insofar, the World Bank’s policy appears to promote the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, like the other concepts discussed in this section.
Again, while Kymlicka treats indigenous peoples as subcategory of national minorities, other theorists as well as international law tend to treat indigenous peoples as a distinct and separate category. However, this thesis won’t discuss that difference in debt, because it does not matter much to the Cambodian case. To anticipate an important insight of the second part of this thesis, applying Kymlicka’s typology to cultural diversity in Cambodia leads to the conclusion that there are no national minorities in Cambodia other than indigenous peoples. Put differently, there are no sub-state nations or stateless nations in Cambodia. In consequence, this means for Cambodia that all the concepts introduced in this section – namely: Kymlicka’s typology, Benhabib’s theory, Convention 169, the UN’s indigenous declaration, and World Bank and ADB policy – would single out indigenous peoples and grant various rights to sustain their distinct existence exclusively to these groups. While the last paragraphs dealt with different classes of groups, the next section will deal with different classes of group-specific rights.
3. Group-Differentiated Rights
For liberals, the protection of individual civil and political rights is of central importance to accommodate cultural difference. In many instances, the protection of those common rights is sufficient to provide space for cultural difference. However, liberal culturalists point out that in other instances it is only through measures beyond common citizenship rights that cultural differences can be accommodated. Kymlicka claims that virtually every modern democracy is using one or more group-specific mechanisms to accommodate cultural differences. He distinguishes between three forms of group-differentiated rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. This typology is related to the initial distinction between ethnic groups and national minorities: in general, Kymlicka suggests that national minorities – including indigenous peoples – can legitimately demand self-government rights and special representation rights. In contrast, ethnic groups typically demand – and should be granted – polyethnic rights and possibly special representation rights.

Illustration 3: ct. Kymlicka 1995
Self-government rights typically involve the devolution of powers to a political subunit which is substantially controlled by the members of a minority group and which substantially corresponds to the group’s traditional homelands. Self-government rights in the form of some political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction are typically demanded by national minorities to ensure the free development of their cultures. Its most extreme form is secession. One way to acknowledge self-government is federalism, which divides powers between the central and various regional governments. It is particularly well suited were national minorities are living territorially concentrated, because the internal boundaries can be drawn so that the group forms a majority in one of the subunits. This can ensure that members of the group are not outvoted by the larger society on vital issues. Federalism is used in Canada to accommodate national diversity with regard to the Quebecois. Moreover, following the demands of the Inuit indigenous group, the Canadian government has approved the redrawing of federal boundaries, so that members of the Inuit form a partially self-governing majority in Nunavut, the eastern half of the Northwest Territories. Nunavut covers about one-fifth of the Canadian land mass (Levy 2000: pp. 307). In contrast, deliberate decisions in the United States were made not to utilize federalism for the accommodation of cultural diversity. Consequently, none of the United State’s existing sub-state units serves to secure self-government for a national minority (Kymlicka 1995: 29). However, self-government for national minorities in the United States is instead achieved outside the federal system (such as in Puerto Rico, Guam) and through political institutions inside existing states (such as Indian reservations). Kymlicka argues that the absence of constitutional protections has tended to make national minorities in the United States more vulnerable. At the same time, those mechanisms can be adjusted more flexibly to the needs and interests of various national minorities. In most cases in North America, federalism is not a valid option for indigenous peoples because they rarely form a majority in one of the sub-state units. Moreover, no redrawing of state boundaries would create majorities of indigenous peoples due to the large influx of settlers. Self-government for most indigenous peoples has been achieved through a system of reserved lands and substantial powers were devolved from the federal government to the tribal or band council. Increasingly Indian tribes or bands were able to acquire control over health, education, family law, policing, criminal justice, and resource development. In effect, they are becoming “a third order of government, with a collection of powers that is carved out of both federal and state/provincial jurisdictions” (Kymlicka: 1995: 30). Similar systems are being sough by indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. Kymlicka supports the view that the incorporation of indigenous peoples into states should be a voluntary act of federation, which recognizes those groups as distinct peoples and respects their inherent right to self-government over their homelands. In this view, indigenous groups should have the freedom to determine for themselves how to manage their traditional homelands within the constraints of principles of justice (Kymlicka 2001a: pp. 148). Self-government for national minorities is not seen as corrective, transitional measure for past oppression, but as inherent and therefore permanent.
Polyethnic rights are typically demanded by ethnic groups in polyethnic states. The demands of ethnic groups have challenged the expectation that their members would abandon all aspects of their cultural heritage. Their claims have gradually expanded beyond the rights to freely express their particularity without fear of discrimination in the larger society. Kymlicka argues that policies designed to prevent discrimination are primarily directed at guaranteeing the common rights of citizenship and should therefore not be considered group-differentiated rights. In contrast, polyethnic rights are positive measures such as the recognition of minority cultures in the curriculum or public funding of cultural practices, such as for ethnic organizations and events or for the provision of immigrant language education in schools. This is mostly defended on the grounds that public funding for art and culture tends to be biased in favor of majority cultural expressions. The most disputed demands are for exemptions from laws that appear to disadvantage members of religious groups, such as exemption from Sunday closing or animal slaughtering legislation for Jews and Muslims, exemptions from the helmet requirement while driving motor bikes for Sikhs, or exemptions from the official dress-codes in schools, police force and the military. According to Kymlicka, this sort of groups-differentiated measures – or ‘polyethnic rights’ “are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society” (Kymlicka 1995: 31). Because the associated cultural differences are not meant to be eliminated, polyethnic rights are seen as permanent. However, the rationale of polyethnic rights is the promotion of integration, not self-government.
There has been increasing interest in the idea of special representation rights. The concern in many democracies is that the political process fails to reflect the diversity of the citizenry. This concern is not limited to cultural minorities, but includes any marginalized or disadvantaged group, such as sexual minorities, the disabled, and so on. The idea of special representation is that an appropriate proportion of seats in government bodies should be reserved for members of disadvantaged or marginalized groups. Special representation rights are usually being justified as response to systemic disadvantages in the political process which does not allow for the proper representation of the group’s views and interests. To the extent that these rights are meant to compensate for disadvantages, they are seen as temporary measure, because the removal of disadvantages eliminates the need for those rights. However, special representation is sometimes defended as a result of self-government, because those rights would be weakened if an external body could unilaterally abolish the associated powers. Because the claims for self-government are seen as inherent, so too are the measures of special representation which stem from it (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 131).
4. Societal Cultures
As was mentioned earlier, the position of liberal culturalism aims to show that some minority rights are consistent with liberal freedom and equality. In Kymlicka’s theory, it is the concept of societal cultures that offers the crucial connection between individual freedom and autonomy on one hand and the group on the other hand. In short, he argues that access to a societal culture is the precondition of the liberal value of freedom of choice. A societal culture is “ a culture which provide its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka 1995: 76). This notion of culture is closely associated with notions of ‘nation’ or ‘people’. Societal cultures exist territorially concentrated and contain a common language as well as shared institutions and practices. Kymlicka argues that the modern world is divided into such societal cultures .
Why is liberal freedom linked to the presence of such societal cultures? Kymlicka identifies individual freedom and autonomy as the defining features of liberalism. Liberalism allows people to choose among a wide range of conceptions of the good life. Moreover, liberalism grants the freedom to question those beliefs and to rationally assess and possibly revise those conceptions in the light of emerging information and new experiences. When people make choices about various conceptions of the good life, they do so based on beliefs about the values of social practices surrounding them. And to have such a belief about the value of particular practices requires an understanding of the meanings assigned to it by culture, language, and history. Whether or not an action or project has any significance to an individual depends on whether, and how, her language attaches meaning to this action or project. For the individual, understanding the cultural narratives provided by her history and language is the precondition of intelligent judgments among available options. It follows that societal cultures not only provide options to citizens, but make those options meaningful to them. Therefore, access to a societal culture is a precondition of liberal freedom and autonomy. Accordingly, group-differentiated rights which secure and promote this access for members of minority cultures should be seen as legitimate from a liberal perspective (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 82) .
Kymlicka stresses that immigrants and national minorities relate very differently to the majority culture. In general, national minorities maintain a societal culture, while ethnic groups do not. Accordingly, the claims of immigrant groups are best met not with self-government rights, but with polyethnic rights. Immigrant bring with them elements of their cultural heritage. However, they have uprooted themselves from their societal culture and left behind the associated set of societal institutions, to which language and historical narratives initially referred to. Even if immigrants would hope to re-create their societal culture, this would be impossible, since immigrants do not come as communities and settle territorially dispersed. In most liberal countries, immigrants are allowed and encouraged to maintain elements of their culture. This, however, is not a change in whether immigrants integrate into the majority culture but how they integrate. While immigrants maintain and nurture aspects of their cultural heritage, it does not take the form of recreating a distinct and institutionally complete societal culture alongside the majority culture. Rather, it contributes new options to the larger society. After a few generations the language of the host country becomes the mother tongue and learning the original mother tongue is not much different from learning a foreign language. For the children of immigrants, it is not their parents’ culture but the host society which provides meaningful options. Immigrants do not attempt to set up a separate societal culture, but ask to adapt the institutions and practices of the mainstream society to ethnic differences so to make the possession of an ethnic identity a normal part of life in the mainstream society (Kymlicka 1995: pp. 95).
The relationship of national minorities to the majority societal culture is different. Members of those groups did not choose to migrate to another state. They did not uproot themselves from their original culture, but formed ongoing societal cultures by the time they where incorporated into the majority culture. Their language and narratives were embodied in a complete set of institutions and social practices, covering the full range of social life and defining meaningful options to their members. National minorities have typically been determined to maintain and perpetuate their existence as distinct societal cultures, despite enormous economic and political pressures towards assimilation or integration. Those groups do not form subgroups within the larger society, but genuinely distinct societal cultures.
Can national minorities loose their capability to form and maintain their societal culture? In particular indigenous peoples have been coercively assimilated in many countries. In such cases, should the group be integrated into the mainstream instead of attempting to preserve what is already lost? Kymlicka notes that in fact a very small number of indigenous peoples has opted to give up their self-government rights and chosen to be treated as a disadvantaged ethnic group. While national minorities surely have no duty to perpetuate a distinct society, the decision whether or not to integrate must be made by members of those groups. Otherwise, the majority would have perverse incentives to profit from injustices towards national minorities, to destroy their societal culture and deny self-government rights based on that destruction. Kymlicka points out that, under appropriate conditions, weakened cultures can regain their strength and richness: “There is no reason to think that indigenous groups, for example, cannot become vibrant and diverse cultures, drawing on their cultural traditions while incorporating the best of the modern world …” (Kymlicka 1995: 100).
At this point it could legitimately be asked why people’s capacity to make meaningful choices depends on access to their own culture, as long as access to the majority culture is secured. No doubt, great numbers of immigrants where glad to integrate into other cultures and function well in their new societies. Kymlicka admits that indeed some people genuinely move between cultures. Yet he points out that even where integration is successful it is a difficult and costly process. People who did not voluntarily choose to move might not legitimately be required to bear the costs of integration. He suggests seeing the choice to leave one’s culture as equivalent to choose a life of perpetual poverty and enter a religious order (Kymlicka 1995: 86). It is taken for granted that the desire for material resources is so normal that people cannot reasonably be expected to relinquish those resources, although some people might voluntarily choose to do so. Analogues, Kymlicka argues that the attachment to one’s culture is usually too strong to be given up. If this is so, access to one’s own culture should be treated as something that people can be expected to want and to which they are entitled.
Another line of reasoning supports this case. Kymlicka argues that a system of open borders would dramatically increase the territory in which people could be treated as free and equal individuals. At the same time, such a system would render people’s own national community vulnerable to being overrun by settlers from other nations and would threaten their survival as a distinct society. Given this choice between increased mobility without borders on one hand and limited mobility but protected existence of the distinct culture on the other hand, most people have preferred the latter. For most people, it has been there nation in which they want to be free and equal individuals. In addition, few liberal theorists have advocated open borders. Rather, they have taken for granted that it is freedom and equality within the own culture what matters most to people: “In short, liberal theorists have generally, if implicitly, accepted that cultures or nations are basic units of liberal political theory” (Kymlicka 1995: 93).
5. Justifying Group-Differentiated Rights
Kymlicka offers three arguments in support of group-differentiated rights: the equality argument, historical agreements, and the inherent value of cultural diversity. As the discussion will show, the last argument is not well-suited to justify self-government rights for national minorities. Moreover, there are no treaties or historical agreements between the majority society and indigenous peoples in Cambodia. Therefore, the discussion here and in the second part will focus on the equality argument. In addition, the analogy between cultural minorities and the existence of states will be explored.
According to the equality argument, group-specific rights are needed to compensate for pervasive and morally arbitrary disadvantages that are faced exclusively by members of minority cultures. It asserts that group-differentiated measures are needed to ensure that all citizens are treated with genuine equality (Kymlicka 1995: 108). Minority groups are unfairly disadvantaged and the survival of their societal cultures is vulnerable to decisions made by the majority. Therefore, given the importance of cultural membership to individuals, this situation creates serious disadvantages for members of cultural minorities, which members of the majority do not face. Accordingly, various minority rights eliminate inequalities, rather than creating them. Group-differentiated rights can help to rectify disadvantages and alleviate the vulnerability of the minority culture. For example, self-government rights can provide members of national minorities with the opportunity to live and work in their own culture, something which is taken for granted by members of the majority.
As was discussed earlier, while governments can be neutral with regard to religion, state neutrality is impossible with regard to ethnicity and culture. While states can abstain from having an official religion, institutions are to be o

Published on Feb 28, 2004

Thousands of Thai-style Buddha statues will be removed from Cambodian pagodas because they distort Khmer Buddhism and present a threat of outside influence, religion officials said in a report yesterday.

Thai Buddha images have been banned in neighbouring Cambodia since 2002, but several statues donated by Thailand have made their way into Khmer pagodas and temples in what is being seen as a challenge to Cambodia’s religious identity, the Cambodia Daily reported.

“We are worried for the future of our religion,” Chao Sikano, chief of the religion department in Banteay Meanchey province bordering Thailand, told the paper, adding that 410 Thai-style Buddha statues were on display in pagodas there.

“We will have a crisis for the next generation” if the issue is not addressed, he said in the English language daily.

“The Thais have a long-term strategy to invade our culture and religion,” he added.

The Thai statues are different from their Khmer counterparts in that they have longer noses, more feminine hands and a different figure, the paper said.

Thai script is written on the back, and Chao Sikano said portraits of the Thai king are embedded inside the statues.

Uong Sophearith, of Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs, said the statues, collected mainly near the Thai border, will be moved to an as yet undetermined central storage facility.

He said the religion ministry would coordinate with those of interior, border soldiers and police to enforce the ban.

Thailand and Cambodia have had historically testy ties, with various Khmer and Thai kingdoms battling each other for cultural and political supremacy over the centuries.

Meanwhile Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Cambodia had the right to act because of the country’s law prohibiting the import of Thai-style Buddha statues.

Thailand is nevertheless worried with the ban in Cambodia, he said, because religion should strengthen relations between both countries.

Agence France-Presse

The Nation

PHNOM PENH

http://nationmultimedia.com/page.news.php3?clid=4&id=109103&usrsess=1

UNICEF has urged governments worldwide to take greater responsibility in ensuring the rights of indigenous children, whom it described as one of the most marginalized groups.
A study, drawn up by UNICEF’s Innocenti Research Center, said 300 million indigenous peoples, spread across more than 70 countries, have far less access to health and education compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. Children suffered the worst, it said.
“The responsibility to promote and protect the human rights of indigenous children is universal,” Carol Bellamy, executive director of the United Nations Children’s Fund, said Wednesday at the launching of the report.
“Indigenous people live with a legacy of oppression, exclusion and extreme poverty,” she added.
Bellamy said the aim of the report, “Ensuring the Rights of Indigenous Children,” was “to see that this issue is placed squarely and unambiguously on the agenda of every government.”
The most pressing problems concerned health and education.
“One way to make indigenous children less invisible right from the beginning is birth registration,” said Bellamy. “Because at least if you exist in the eyes of the system perhaps there may be better delivery of services.”
The study indicated that indigenous children’s problems were not restricted to income-poor nations and that it extended from the United States to Australia, and Bolivia to Cambodia.
She cited examples such as the poor level of education provided for American Indian children in the United States and the disproportionately high percentage of aboriginal children entangled in the juvenile justice system in Australia.
“In northeast Cambodia, indigenous children’s chances of survival are put at less than half of that of the population as a whole,” she added.
Strong social and political action and commitment was needed on behalf of governments, not just individual groups, she said.
©2004 Associated Press
www.sfgate.com

This is Saturday. I get up relatively late and ride to the riverside to have breakfast. Later I go to the Central Market, to buy some stuff, including clothes and a CF card reader for easier transfer of pictures from my camera to the computer. There is some sort of shopping center next to the Market, located in one of the highest and most modern buildings in town. I spend more than two hours here and actually take some nice pictures from the roof. However, due to malfunctions of the card reader I mentioned earlier I loose those pictures, which is a shame. Moreover, the card reader seems to have disabled two of my flashcards, which is particularly pitiful in the case of my only 256 MB card.

I have fast food for lunch, which is actually the first time in Cambodia I eat burger. Later I go home and still later decide to visit the Royal Palace today. I read in my guidebook that entrance and camera fee is $5 and an official guide between $2 and $4. I reach at about 4 pm. After I pay five bucks I am told by the only available guide that the costs of his service are actually $5. He studies at Norton University’s Faculty of Law. So I tell him I am a student myself and cannot afford so much money. It takes me some time to negotiate $4.

This is Tevea Vinichhay, the hall in which Cambodia’s kings are inaugurated. Visitors are allowed to enter but not to take pictures. The inside is designed convivially, featuring the thrown and a number of objects of pure gold.

This is the kings’ residence. Visitors are not allowed to enter.

The smaller building is used as waiting room as well as by the king to get on his elephants. The building in the background is Chan Chhaya Pavilion. It was used for traditional dance performances. Today, the king speaks to crowds of citizens outside the compound on national holidays from here. My guide tells me that those masses are mostly composed or rural folks. Until recently I was under the wrong impression that this is actually the Silver Pagoda.

The Inauguration Hall from the south.

This villa in front of the administration building is a present from France. It served Empress Eugenie as accommodation for the opening of the Suez Channel and was then recycled as a gift to Cambodia’s King, shipped to Phnom Penh and reassembled.

This is Silver Pagoda. The pillars and stairs are made of marble from Italy.

There is a nice model of Angkor Wat in front of it.

We enter the pagoda. However, it is not allowed to take pictures. The ground consists of 5281 plates of pure silver, each of them weights more than one kilo. There are countless objects made of pure gold, among them a Buddha of about 90 kilogram. There is another huge Buddha made of smaragd. Many objects are presents of various heads of states to Cambodia’s kings.

Outside again: This is called paper tree. The blossoms of this tree have different colors.

In addition there is a colorful butterfly.

By now it is about 5 pm and my guide has to go to attend his classes. I give him $5 and he generously forgets that we agreed upon 4. I go and see the elephant place on my own, which is not very spectacular. Generally, despite a number of objects of gold and silver, the possessions of the monarchy appear rather humble. Moreover, many objects do not seem to be in a good shape and the way they are presented is in many instances not as glamorous as one might expect.

From the Royal Palace I ride to Lucky! Lucky! at Monivong Boulevard to get me a 100 ccm Honda over the weekend. From here I leave to one of my favorite Khmer food places. Still later I go home and continue writing my blog.

I should have mentioned that I moved into another accommodation. Even before I went to Mondulkiri I was talking to Katrin on the phone. Katrin has been working in Cambodia and is in Germany by now. Katrin’s partner is Toby from Canada who has been working in Cambodia for a number of years. He is currently in Germany, too.

So Katrin suggests moving into Toby’s flat for some time. I found this a pleasing prospect, and tried to meet the key person. However, before I leave to Mondulkiri I cannot find a person capable of English, while my Khmer still does not allow me to solve problems.

When I come back on Thursday I find that there is no room in the Amok guesthouse available, where I have been living for many weeks now. So for the time being I move into the Top Banana guesthouse, which is right next to it.

This is the street in which I have been living for so long. The picture is taken from the balcony of the guesthouse. Behind the yellow gate in the background is Wat Lanka.

This is the Amok guesthouse.

So after I spend the night in the cheap but not very appealing top banana guesthouse I consider moving. Toby’s flat is actually nicely located in the center of the city, close to the National Museum and the Royal Palace. I find the owner and he encourages me to move in. So later on I pack my stuff at the guesthouse, get a Taxi and move to Toby’s flat.

I have been here before but did not remember how charming this place actually is. This is the view from the balcony in the afternoon. On the opposite side of the street is the Faculty of Archeology, a prestigious academic institution on the compound of the National Museum. Behind the compound of the National Museum is the compound of the Royal Palace.

This is the living room.

I must say this is a great accommodation. Not only are there much more light and space, a balcony and a nice view from the window. I can actually walk around now, and step out on the balcony. Unlike in the guesthouse, it is Khmer people who live here and this place allows to be right in the center of contemporary Khmer life. I can hear the sound of Khmer life in the house and can smell what people are cooking. And people in the house are a very friendly and helpful lot.